e-flux journal

Editors
Editorial

Increasingly it seems like no large exhibition opens without an artist boycott. And the reasons to withdraw are legitimate—a gulf museum employs migrant labor under terms approaching slavery, a biennial sponsor corporation operates an offshore detention center, works are censored for petty moral reasons, a municipality passes a homophobic law, or funding is traced to an occupying state with a staggering record of ongoing human rights abuses.

Of course, these petitions can start to come off as a nuisance to those who believe that a healthy cultural industrial complex thrives on its distance from power and politics, as if some kind of contemplative distancing that makes art possible in the first place must also be too elegant to deal with the mundane financing or bloodstained politics of its hosts. But now there are so many petitions, so many threats to withdraw, that it becomes clear that the conditions for producing and exhibiting art have become ethically unbearable for too many artists—and this comes at the same time that the economic and political utility of contemporary art is becoming clear to global players discovering how supporting vanguard cultural production can humanize their own image. Where industrialists before put their surplus into culture — often to curry favor with the municipality—now municipalities, industrialists, and feudal lords alike use culture as advertising. And the staggering number of boycotts can be understood   as the artistic response to these particular advances in the industrialization of the art world, and of art.

An important part of this shift is a change in the status of cultural production in general. Basically, art can no longer be taken to be an automatically good thing. If artworks have for over a century pointed to transformations in political or social consciousness, many artists are now coming to terms with the degree to which artworks are already functionalized as instruments of blunt social and political realities. While these realities might be depressing to idealistic types, or confusing to connoisseurial contemplative types, it would be a shame to miss what a profound reformatting of time we are currently experiencing when the engine of historical progress that defined the modern tradition slows down and bifurcates into the endless mirroring and redistribution of the present time. Technology turns naturalistic and advanced materialist accounts read global swarms of waste products for legible signs, for points where planetary-scale desires start to look structural or infrastructure-ish. The real discovery in all this may in fact be in a slow and relentless unraveling of what a sham the modern tradition may have been the whole time as an era profoundly overstuffed with heroic promises layered over a sewer of neglect, of all the contradictions that modernity necessarily had to suppress in order to sustain its wildly progressive claims. And the *Charlie Hebdo* killings in Paris this past month could be seen as a testament to this.

While many find it difficult under these circumstances to identify the clearly marked political horizons of the past, we can also see artists taking these large-scale structural shifts into account to build an awareness of the strength of their own blind complicity, of their proximity to power, or of their coordinated opposition, as producers or nonproducers within the cultural industrial complex. And when it comes to the boycotts, the very interesting thing to notice is something that comes beneath the layer of moral indignation that any boycott petition has to use, because many of the artists involved in organizing or joining these boycotts are, in their work, already dealing with what is being boycotted. In many cases the same artists withdrawing their participation are actually extremely interested in the bloodstained funder, the weapons manufacturer, the moral police, or the draconian state policies they stand together with other artists to oppose.

Of course this is by no means a contradiction. Rather, it suggests that we may be witnessing a very sophisticated war of position that is renegotiating the way artists seek to simultaneously instrumentalize and be instrumentalized by hegemonic forces that far surpass them in scale. It is to say: a dictator is funding the exhibition, and I will not participate in the exhibition with my work on this dictator—he belongs to me, and within my work, and I do not belong to him. In terms of military strategy, it can be taken as a flanking or pincer maneuver to surround and contain the thing that might otherwise surround and contain you.

The artist Ahmet Öğüt, who has found himself participating in a number of recent boycott actions, has described how he began questioning the effectiveness of boycotts that only rely on a refusal or withdrawal of labor. Maybe the boycott attracts too much righteous indignation or self-interest. Maybe it's not sufficiently encompassing in scale to modify the terms of the agreement. Funders are by definition rich, and almost never interested in art. They can just as easily find another artist who will accept the terms. Furthermore, artists are often invited to participate in exhibitions not by funders, but by curators and institutions who respect their work. Why reject that dialogue outright? With this in mind, Öğüt began thinking of what Gayatri Spivak has called affirmative sabotage—saying yes, entering into the agreement, but with a caveat: the artist participates on the condition that she or he has license to intervene in all operational aspects of the event, potentially causing significant problems for funders. Potentially turning a biennial into an exposé on the transgressions of its funders. Potentially scaring those funders away for good when they realize they are in over their heads.

—Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, Anton Vidokle

Julieta Aranda is an artist and an editor of *e-flux journal.*

Brian Kuan Wood is an editor of *e-flux journal.*

Anton Vidokle is an editor of e-flux journal and chief curator of the 14th Shanghai Biennale: Cosmos Cinema.

X

Luis Camnitzer

The Detweeting of Academia

A few days ago it was my birthday.[1] I find that birthdays are the real days of atonement, days when one revisits the past, vacuums it, takes stock, apologizes at least mentally, and distills lessons. Because they are tailor-made and private, I take birthdays much more seriously than somber holidays imposed by religion. Going through this form of accounting I realized, probably once more, that I'm still a militant and a student—a leftist student at that. I realized that I'm still Jewish of sorts, although totally secular. And I reconfirmed that I believe in ethics, although I see that they are increasingly ineffectual and may only serve as a tool for resistance in an increasingly collapsing world.

The student part in this is a consequence of having been raised in Uruguay, in a progressive atmosphere, and with education free for everybody. During my education I absorbed the principles of the Reform of Cordoba, Argentina, of 1918. This reform instituted an anti-elitist and autonomous university system, with students taking part in the government of the institution, with a mission to learn in order to improve society, and with the belief that education is a right and not something to be bought. By the time I studied, all students knew that we were in a privileged period of our lives. We were not mature but we were intellectually okay, ready to expand our knowledge, and aware that during that period we did not yet have to kneel in front of power or be corrupted. We were not consumers of prepackaged goods who approached them with the attitude of buyers. We were the soul and moral compass of the university and therefore also of society. And we knew that this role was something that would stop the day we graduated. Some of us, like me, would look back on this time fondly, others would renege, and many would simply be hypocritical and attribute their former actions to the unrealistic idealism of youth.

The Jewish part is because I was born into a Jewish family. We had to emigrate from Germany because of anti-Semitism. We were unacceptable to the US because of anti-Semitism. We were lucky to land in Uruguay when I was one year old, and that is what made me who I am. So, I'm a Uruguayan Jew. However, the Jewish part is only an ethical component, a bond with my grandparents who were gassed with the famous six million, all of whom I feel died so that I may live.

The ethics part is probably a product of the other two, and also the more difficult one to keep going. But it's clear to me that it precedes my need to make art and that it informs the art I make. It's the root of my belief that when done correctly, art and education become the same thing. It's because of this that both are ultimately forms of political action. It's certainly not because of any particular message they may scream to an audience either from the walls of a gallery or from a teacher's desk.

When I heard that Professor Steven Salaita was fired from the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, my first instinct was to turn down an invitation I had just received

This map was created by a twelve-year-old Jewish boy, Fritz Freudenheim, detailing his family's emigration from Nazi Germany in 1938.

to speak there. Being committed to education means that I'm prevented from sponsoring or believing in theocracies, exceptionalisms, fundamentalisms, and hypocrisy. Separate, they are already bad enough. In different degrees of combination they provoke my misanthropy and put me at odds with a lot of countries, institutions, and people, including this university. This means that for me, the problem is not really what direction relations between Palestinians and Israelis take. It's the fanaticism that may go in either direction and that supersedes the possibility of any sane confrontation between opposing ideas. The confusing of Jewish individuals with Israeli citizens happens on both sides of the spectrum. It tends to ignore that there are some sane people in any population, and it forgets that it is this sanity that should be aimed at in any educational institution. I normally don't care about biographical information, but here I want to avoid any misunderstandings. Since I believe that technically I could even claim Israeli citizenship, it becomes more pertinent.

However, that possibility had never crossed my mind because I don't conceive of equating religion with statehood. I believe that to equate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism is intellectual fraud.

So, boycotting the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign was an obvious and easy step for me, but it was also a presumptuous measure. It would only satisfy a conversation with myself and have no effect. After much thought I therefore decided to accept the invitation to go and talk about my work, in spite of misgivings. But I decided that I would not in fact talk about my work. One of the reasons I ultimately accepted the invitation was that the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign is a public university. I believe that what we call education should be both educational and public.

Though not free of charge as it should be, in theory at least the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign is still

During the University Reform of 1918, students take the University of Cordoba and hoist the flag of Argentina. Copyright: General Archive of the Nation.

public, not-for-profit, and hopefully dedicated to inquiry. To boycott this campus would be to mistake the mission of the institution for the mistakes committed by transient and narrow-minded individuals. Fanaticism and stupidity are bad qualities, particularly when those defined by them are rich and in power. Public universities exist to fight these limitations and to make sure that the next batch of rich people who reach power are better. Good education exists to ensure that ethics don't deteriorate when the state abrogates its financial duties and allows privatization to take over. If the state is badly administered and private funds are required, I understand that there is a need for a financial transaction. It's the institution's responsibility, however, to ensure that values are not negotiated away during this process. So I came, figuring that showing support for those that are fighting for these values is more important than saying a self-satisfying "no."

There are many questions for me personally in the determination of the values we are fighting for, or should be fighting for. In my case, I often ponder what would have happened if my family had not been Jewish. Would I have

grown up in Germany? Might I have become a German anti-Semite myself? Or what if the US hadn't been anti-Semitic? What if it had been open to immigration as promised by the Statue of Liberty, without quotas, walls, or vigilantes? Might I then have become a US chauvinist exceptionalist? The answer lies in the potential strength of my values, helped by ethics and critical thinking. Based on this, I will make my own controversial statement now: The creation of Israel, though understandable in its motivation, was a predictable mistake, and history has proven it so.

My next statement is much less controversial, and stems from my fondness for metaphors. I like metaphors because I see them as an efficient way to compress data. A lot of information is condensed into a verbalized image which, once it is heard or read, unfolds through evocation, creating a rich and understandable totality. It's a poetic and not a mathematically true compression, nothing to do with JPEG or TIFF images on a computer. So, I will use a walnut as a metaphor for the university. The shell is hard, wrinkled, and will eventually be discarded. But, like the Board of Trustees and whatever parts of the

Bonnie Coyle, "Stand With Salaita (2)," digital poster, 2014.

administration collaborate with the Board, the shell puts pressure on the inside, exploits its tenderness, overcomes its possible resistance, and causes it to wither and wrinkle. The dilemma then is: What should define the walnut—the shell or the kernel? As an educator, I obviously choose the kernel. I will try to protect and nourish it, and I will fight the pressure applied by the shell as much as I can.

Due to its own nature, the shell wants to prevail in its mission to train students to be good workers, avoiding any waves of dissent along the way. The success of the university is measured by its public image and not by the individual maturation of its students. As a consequence, the university's money goes primarily to sports, to industrial research, and to the salaries of administrators, sometimes even after they have resigned. I saw that a former chancellor of the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign who was forced to resign receives $212,000 a year because he helped admit well-connected applicants who normally would not merit consideration.

Nice for him. In exchange for this generous severance package, he comes to campus once a week.[2]

So, focusing on this walnut, we may see the Salaita affair from two angles. One is anecdotal and ripe for a soap opera. The other concerns the philosophical underpinnings and aims of education. Continuing our walnut metaphor, the Salaita affair raises the question of whether education should be a mechanism to satisfy the shell, or a tool to help the kernel exercise its freedom of thought.

In the soap opera version, there is a professor who is led to give up his tenured position in one institution and take a new tenured position in another. He moves with his family, giving up their house and the schools his children attended. He delivers his teaching plan according to the schedule he received, makes controversial remarks on social media networks that he believes are private, and rubs donors the wrong way because they don't think these networks are private. Finally, the professor is fired two weeks before he is due to begin teaching. We all sympathize with his plight. We are also alarmed because we fear that there might be other similar stories in the future. The story is sad, and the soap opera is badly written by the Board of Trustees, whose members, together with the administration, are the real protagonists. The professor is the unfortunate victim. He plays a secondary role and is doubly victimized: by overzealous administrators, and by bad literature.

The other angle, the philosophical one, is more serious. It actually affects the future of an enormous amount of people, both immediately and later by becoming a noxious precedent. Robert Easter, the president of the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, defended the decision to fire—or to "dehire"—Salaita in an interview with the Chicago Tribune, even before the Board voted on the issue:

> At the end of the day, we have to look out for the students and potential students first and foremost … It is important to have an institution where people are not afraid to apply or attend because they feel their views are not respected … Our obligation is to make sure we have the most diverse, inclusive campus that we can have.[3]

In its doublespeak, the statement seems to belong to the libretto of the soap opera. I understand Easter to be saying that to ensure diversity, there is a need to exclude anybody who does not endorse Israel and/or Zionism. This implies that diversity has to be eliminated in order to keep diversity going—a startling vision for an educational institution. The expectation used to be that a good discussion between opposing views helps education.

This mock wall was erected by students at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign in opposition to Israel's occupation of Gaza and the firing of professor Steven Salaita.

Educational institutions would actively seek out different opinions in order to have a good level of discussion and avoid excluding the opponent. With Easter's oxymoronic theory about homogeneous diversity, we end up littering the field with universities that are pro-something on one side, and universities that are anti-something on the other. Or worse, like during the dark McCarthy era, we may end up with only one kind of university.

Another serious implication of the Salaita affair is that the Board usurped academic monitoring duties that belong to the faculty and students. By doing this, the Board confused opinion with policy. I know that the word "opinion" is ambiguous, so I will give it some precision. By "opinion" I refer to a form of gut feeling, an unmediated thought that, because it's based on beliefs and unconscious sentiments, is not fully examined or proven. In fact, this connection between opinion and gut feeling raises the question of whether the gut accommodates the head, or whether the head conforms to the gut. Either way, the final result is the same.

When the opinions of the Board of Trustees inform policies that should be monitored by those in charge of academic matters, there is reason for alarm. But the gut feelings of the Broad are not the only gut feelings at play in this affair. Salaita's opinions, although expressed outside the school, were arguably ill-advised. Indeed, we have many derelictions happening simultaneously:

1. Salaita was arguably foolish in the way he phrased and disseminated his opinions. His opinions were just that—gut-feeling statements without any pedagogical value.

2. The university was arguably foolish to hire Salaita

without vetting him first.

3. Salaita was arguably naive to accept the appointment without vetting the university first, although prior to this incident, the school's reputation on free speech issues was apparently not bad.

4. The university arguably lacked a clear idea of the relationship between the space of social media and the space of the classroom. I don't have a clear idea about this either, but I'm not an institution, so in my case it doesn't matter.

5. The university and the Board were arguably remiss in failing to establish a policy on the use of social media—or if they did have such a policy, they failed to publicize it sufficiently.

Clearly, the accumulation of all these facts and possibilities cannot take the place of policy. It's really bizarre that it has managed to do so.

Since Salaita was presumably hired through faculty procedures, he should be fired through faculty procedures. Otherwise, we have opinion overruling procedures that reflect policy. Policy may sometimes fail, but when it does, it should be corrected through legislation, not through the use of power. Trustees are as much responsible for serving as role models as are faculty, and the abuse of power is not a very good pedagogical tool. However, the need to separate opinion from policy *is* a good topic to be pursued pedagogically. I wonder what would happen if the University organized an in-depth discussion on the question of "opinion vs. policy." Might it lead to institutional self-analysis and reform? It would be revealing to have a frank discussion that included the chancellor, the Trustees, Salaita, students, and faculty. Besides providing material for many PhD theses, the results could become a point of reference for people both inside and outside the institution. The discussion might even help everybody involved in the affair grow up a little. Otherwise, the next logical and inevitable step is the organization of a local branch of the NSA to monitor tweets and emails. The Board could then make sure that some opinions prevail over others, and that their idiosyncratic version of diversity is instituted.

The conflict between opinion and policy reminds me of when the Uruguayan parliament voted to decriminalize abortion some years ago. When the law reached the president's desk, he vetoed it because it went against his Catholic beliefs. Though he was basically a progressive guy who was voted into office as the leader of a leftist coalition, the president allowed his personal opinion to overrule a democratically approved policy. He committed an abuse of power. Many years before, in 1990, the conservative King Baudouin of Belgium faced the exact same conundrum. But unlike the president of Uruguay, his actions were admirable. He abdicated for one day. The

Belgium's former Queen Fabiola passed away in December of 2014.

prime minister took over temporarily and signed the law during the king's absence. The king's opinion was preserved and an abuse of power was avoided.

The primary space for opinion is one's head informed by the gut. The space for the construction of policy is outside the head. Even if the same opinion occurs in many heads informed by many guts and is therefore shared, it still operates in internal space. That is why policies that simply implement opinions—that is, policies that don't involve an objective analysis of ideas and consequences—are so dangerous. The correct negotiation between the head and the gut is much more complex than a simple enunciation of beliefs, and fights between gut feelings are pointless.

Now it's time to insert some talk about art, since that is my real field. Opinions are relatively harmless as long as they remain in the private space. But as soon as they leave the private space and are expressed, things change. An expression is an opinion that has just walked out from the head, and that is why Expressionist art risks not being much more than opinion. Once expression starts walking in public space, it becomes communication and therefore stops being harmless. As communication, opinions can have an effect on policy, and policy in turn shapes collective space. While the impact of art on policy is minimal, art nonetheless affects culture. So our responsibility as artists is to act as if art actually determined policy.

This all means that freedom of opinion is one thing, and freedom of expression is something very different. Opinion is allowed to be irresponsible, but when one communicates, one should be accountable for what one is communicating. The way we use the phrase "freedom of expression" does not take these things into consideration. We need to be more nuanced. We should regard "freedom of opinion," "freedom of expression," and "freedom of communication" as three distinct categories with different degrees of responsibility. When it comes to censorship, it

is "freedom of communication" that is repressed, not "freedom of opinion." If we decide to insult someone, we should be aware of what might happen afterwards. This does not mean that freedom should be curtailed through censorship. It means that we should know that we have to assume different levels of responsibly in the exercise of each of these freedoms. In a good institution, policy is there to help us be responsible. It is not there to shut us up.

I don't know if this university is a good institution. But one of the missions of any university is to be a good institution. In light of this, the Salaita incident seems to be a clash of opinions in the absence of policy. There is no consideration of either spaces or responsibilities. If a chancellor resigned in the wake of a scandal and still gets paid more than most faculty; if faculty is hired and then fired not because of fraudulent claims they made, but because of sloppy vetting; if donors can shape the educational mission according to their own opinions and interests; if faculty and students, who are the core and raison d'être of the institution, are ignored in academic decisions—if all this is allowed to occur, then there is no policy in place. Then the university is or may become a bad institution. There is no longer an ethical compass. There is only the fickle, but disguised, rule of opinions.

This leads me, believe it or not, to art education. As it's usually understood, art transverses distinct spaces. Starting in the private space of opinion and intuition, art breaks out to become expression, and then uses the communicative space in hopes of becoming part of policy. In the case of art, "policy" means the canon, and becoming part of it means garnering museum approval. This process does not include any training or education in responsibility and accountability. Although art tries to mess with brains and hearts, there is no Hippocratic Oath taken in art schools. There are no courses on "ethics and art." Although everything is about being original and breaking out of the box, there is no discussion about breaking the shell of the walnut.

I have a different view of art. I see it as a very general methodology, as a metadiscipline that includes all other disciplines. In fact, I see science as a minor accident in the acquisition of knowledge. I see science as a field that is seriously limited by having to use logic, causality, and repeatable experiments. There is nothing wrong with any of this, but art is all of this plus the opposite. Art also includes illogic, the suspension of laws, absurdity, non-repeatability, impossibility, and the search for an alternative, not-yet-existing order. This means that art should inform science and everything else as well.

I believe art should do so because it's the only methodology that allows for unhampered imagination and wonder, for asking in an unrestrained way the question "what if?," for challenging the given systems of order and speculating about new ones. It's the ultimate tool for

"Gagged Lincoln" poster created by a campaign in support of Steven Salaita.

critical thinking.

In other words, art is education. Even if as artists we continue acting as the producers of objects, we should also realize that we are educating others for the purpose of challenging, reorienting, and expanding knowledge. We may keep on polluting the world with things called "art," and more particularly with "my art," but we should understand that we are ultimately preparing the space for the development of collective policies that generate the freest and most empowering form of what we call "culture." We must accept this responsibility and act accordingly.

If we agree with this, the whole idea of art school becomes deeply questionable. This is not a point I want to pursue here because I don't want to add to unemployment figures. But it's clear to me that as they function today, art schools aren't doing much good. The more academic ones start with life drawing and then follow a hypothetical progression based on a linear reading of art history. More modern schools skip life drawing and begin with Painting 1, 2, and 3, mistaking art schools for craft schools. The still more progressive schools are mainly concerned with

teaching students how to behave in the art market. None of these schools teaches how to create, because they consider artistic ability to be an inborn quality that cannot be taught.

What remains important in all of this is that art—or better, art-thinking—gives us an individual accountability system that not only helps us to explore the open field of creation: it also helps us to negotiate the transition from the space of opinion to the space of policy. Art-thinking shouldn't be confined to the making of commodities or the expressing of opinions. Neither one does much for education, justice, or culture unless something else, something more important, takes place.

I decided to read Salaita's tweets. I started with tweets he sent on September 21, 2014 and worked my way back as far as July 23, 2014. Then I got tired and gave up. I did not find the offensive and incendiary tweets that were quoted in the campaign against him. This only means that those who did find them had a lot more time and patience than I do. Apparently they really needed to find them.

There seems to be a simple and elegant solution to the mess the University has got itself into: let Salaita come to school once a week and pay him $212,000 a year. After all, the University has a precedent for this. Any intellectual damage the Board feared Salaita might inflict would thus be minimized. Even less damage would be inflicted if Salaita's teaching duties were limited to ethnic cooking or something else that has nothing to do with Israel or Gaza. He should be happy with this arrangement.

Although retired, my vocation is still teaching, so I would now like to propose some assignments:

1. In a tweet he sent on July 30, 2014, Salaita expressed the following: "It seems the only way Obama and Kerry can satisfy Israel's Cabinet is if they bludgeon Palestinian children with their own hands." The statement reflects Salaita's opinion and anger. It is clearly a metaphorical statement, since it is unlikely that the Israeli cabinet sees this as either possible or desirable; nor is it likely that Salaita believes this is possible or desirable. Being metaphorical, the opinion does not express pure, unmediated rage, but instead involves some construction. Please answer the following questions. A) What are the conditions that generated the rage? B) What remains once the rage component is eliminated? In addition, please complete the following tasks. 1) Create a new metaphor so that those conditions may be communicated in a persuasive way. 2) Describe possible policies that might correct the original problem. 3) Replace Salaita's metaphor with your own, and make your point using a medium you think is effective (social media, a poster, a video, etc.).

2. Similar to a no-fly zone, the University campus has been declared an apolitical zone. No communication involving

any political content or intent is allowed to circulate. A) Identify a political cause to be promoted. B) Research the geography and culture of the campus to pinpoint possible paths for the circulation of information. C) Evaluate these circuits for efficiency in communication and possible duration of service. D) Avoid tunnels. E) Choose the appropriate format, and design it the best you can.

3. Let's assume that there is no free expression allowed on campus except in designated areas such as bathrooms and dorms. But there are not enough bathrooms on campus, and all the dorms are taken. Design new free-expression areas to be placed around campus in easily accessible locations. Free expression has to be contained in these places—it must not spill out. These locations have to be comfortable and weatherproof, and they must stimulate free expression. Use Photoshop or something similar for your presentation.

4. Research existing urban legends. A) Invent a new urban legend. B) Create an advertising campaign on campus with the aim of establishing the legend as fact.

5. Think of an offensive issue that will upset the ethical sensibilities of the University's student body, faculty, administration, or Board of Trustees—or all of them simultaneously. Develop a campaign to raise funds around the issue, with the aim of increasing the University's endowment.

X

Luis Camnitzer is an Uruguayan artist who has lived in the US since 1964, and an emeritus professor of art at the State University of New York, College at Old Westbury. From 1999 to 2006 he was the Viewing Program Curator for The Drawing Center, New York. In 2007, he was the pedagogical curator for the 6th Mercosul Bienal. He was pedagogical curator for the Iberê Camargo Foundation in Porto Alegre, and was a pedagogical advisor for the Cisneros Foundation. He is the author of New Art of Cuba (1994/2004) and Conceptualism in Latin American Art: Didactics of Liberation (2007), both from University of Texas Press.

1
This talk was delivered at the
University of Illinois at
Urbana–Champaign on
November 11, 2014.

2
The former chancellor in question
is Richard H. Herman, who served
in this position at the University of
Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
from 2005 to 2009.

3
Jodi S. Cohen. "U. of I. trustees
vote 8-1 to reject Salaita,"
Chicago Tribune , Sept. 11, 2014
http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-salaitia-board-decision-2
0140911-story.html#page=1

Simon Sheikh

Circulation and Withdrawal, Part I: Circulation

Circulation organizes time and vice versa. Public discourse is contemporary, and it is orientated to the future, the contemporaneity and the futurity in question are those of its own circulation.
—Michael Warner[1]

Nothing is less passive than the act of fleeing, of exiting. Defection modifies the conditions within which the struggle takes place, rather than presupposing those conditions to be an unalterable horizon; it modifies the context within which a problem has arisen, rather than facing this problem by opting for one or the other of the provided alternatives. In short, *exit* consists of unrestrained invention which alters the rules of the game and throws the adversary completely off balance.
—Paolo Virno[2]

It lies in the nature of a magazine that it goes public, hence the term publication. At a certain moment, and with specific intervals, a magazine is made available to the public, whether on newsstands, in specialist bookstores, or online. It thus circulates its discourse through punctuation. But what happens in between—namely, the decisions on themes, articles, edits, graphic design, and, yes, adverts—is nonpublic. In some cases the publication of a publication may even be accompanied by a public campaign, from marketing to launch events. But in many ways, the main work of a magazine, of its production of meaning, is nonpublic—up until the moment of publication, when another circulation and production of meaning happens: that of distribution and readership.

After all, the meaning of a magazine and its discursive production is as dependent on reading as it is on writing and editing: a magazine *is* always its audience, if not one with its audience. But the fact that the production of a magazine is withdrawn from the public is not the same as an exit from the public sphere as such; it is not a withdrawal from and of discourse. Why, then, circulation *and* withdrawal? This has to do with the relation a magazine has to its objects and subjects, and how it constitutes a public as specific, and sometimes in opposition to dominant forms of publicness and official cultural policies. Sometimes withdrawal is enforced, through economy or censorship, but other times it is intentional and tactical: the withdrawal from certain public debates and arenas is what makes an alternative cultural and critical production possible. However, it is not a question of circulation *or* withdrawal, i.e., publicness *or* concealment, but of a movement between these two moments, heightening their connection. It is a question, in other words, of circulation *and* withdrawal.

The term "circulation" is usually used in a very specific way when employed in the context of a magazine and its culture: it indicates the number of copies of each edition distributed upon publication. This has historically been a point of pride, with certain newspapers even printing their circulation numbers on their masthead, to attest to the

strength and reach of the publication in question. It is implied, naturally, that a high circulation means a high number of readers, and thus great importance and influence. In other words, the figures of circulation are indicative of the publication's actual reach—the more the merrier, whether most of these buyers actually read it, or whether, which is more likely, others than just the buyer or subscriber read the individual copy.

Richard Caton Woodville, Politics in an Oyster House, 1848. Oil on fabric. 54.29 x 43.97 x 7.94 cm.

In any case, the key figure in this circulation debate is precisely the buyer—the buyer as indicative of the reader. Even if there is more than one person reading each purchased copy, it is the buyer or subscriber who is the primary reader, constituting the readership in terms of numbers and in terms of a constituency. Even if the mode of address of the publication is somewhat universal, it is always at the same time specific, since the readers are actualized as readers through their purchase of a single copy or of a subscription. The success and relevance of the magazine is thus, along the same lines, measurable in numbers, and in income. Buyers not only provide direct income for the publication, ensuring its survival and sustainability; they also provide access to increased revenue in the form of advertising, which in most cases will make up by far the largest part of the publication's

revenue. So, circulation gives access to an economic circuit in two ways, through the income gained from direct sales and subscriptions, and through the revenue generated by placed adverts.

Circulation does not only indicate these sources of monetary income, i.e., real capital; it also indicates symbolic capital, and the movement between the two. On the one hand, the monies generated from sales, subscriptions, and advertising constitute real capital for the publication, its owners, backers, and shareholders. On the other, this real capital in the form of high circulation numbers gives the publication a symbolic capital as influential in its field, in its city, nation, or community. Real capital thus supplies a magazine with symbolic capital, that can in turn be transformed back into real capital, since the more people read it, the more sense it makes for a business to advertise in said publication.

Lynda Benglis, Artforum advertisement, 1974.

Moreover, if you as a reader are interested in a certain topic, where better to turn than the most widely circulated and thus most influential and important magazine in the field? In the logic of consumer capitalism, the symbolic and the real are intertwined, and surely the biggest magazine in a particular field must be the leading one? In this sense, power produces power, or rather, the appearance of power: if so many people read a certain magazine, and so many parties thus place ads in it, it follows that it must be important, always reinforcing its own circuit of power in a loop of meaning that mirrors the intrinsically linked logics of both consumer capitalism and electoral democracy. In this game of numbers, it is exactly the counting, or accounting if you will, that matters, and not whether the publication in question confirms the values of its readers, or tries to question them, and perhaps even undoes them. In this logic of capital, there is no discussion of the role of readership, and what it means *to read*, and thus what it means to write, to address. And location and distribution are only a matter, again, of numbers, of units, and not of barriers of language, culture, geography, and class.

13

Certainly, access to real capital always provides symbolic capital, but does the opposite also hold true? That is, can and must symbolic capital also always be transformed into real capital? And what would be the terms of such a transformation? When does, for example, a counterculture become an *over-the-counter culture*, and is this move inevitable, and can it be produced through the work of the magazine itself, as in the contested notion of the (counter)cultural entrepreneur? A simple answer is that symbolic capital becomes transformed when the production of meaning, both in text and image, becomes actualized as capital—paraphrasing Guy Debord, but it must be immediately complicated and contradicted on two points. First, this move, however intentional and well planned, is not always successful; indeed the occasions when a small publisher or cultural producer *fails* in going mainstream, fails to find a buyer for its selling out, by far out number the realizations of such lofty goals! Secondly, it is not only a matter of intentionality, but also one of incorporation, or even co-optation, of a given (counter)cultural production into the system of capital—and this integration may not even have to include the actual producers, but only their mode of production, their discourse, that can be appropriated, or, if you will, subsumed …

The relation between real and symbolic capital, and the transformation of one into the other, is, of course, crystallized in the particular production of texts and images that is advertising, and as mentioned above, the bigger the circulation, the more prospective advertisers a publication is likely to have. But contrary to conventional editorial thought, these ads are not only what makes a magazine possible, insofar as they generate the income that supports the magazine's production and circulation of discourse. These ads are also part of what *makes* the magazine. In other words, the ads aren't just part of a magazine's real economy; they are also part of its symbolic economy, and, furthermore, part of its mode of address. This holds particularly true for art magazines, where the adverts from various galleries and museums are part of the information the magazine offers—indeed, they are sort of its "news" section, letting you know what is on display where. This is also why art magazines appear more and more like fashion magazines, where the adverts are part of the publication's look and its discourse—taken to its logical conclusion by a publication like *Purple*, that indeed started in critical journal format, but is now a high street fashion and art magazine. But the same applies to all magazines that include advertising. Any exegesis of one of the art world's central and hegemonic magazines—say *Artforum* or *Frieze*—would not just examine the numbered content pages, but also all the ads in the front and back, each and everyone of them being part and parcel of the image and discourse-production of the magazine.

The notion of a magazine as a mode of address recalls Michael Warner's eminent description of the production

and formation of publics and counterpublics, both, significantly, spelled in the plural: not one, but many. Not only are dominant and marginal publics structured similarly, namely, through self-organization rather than state-operated forms of communication and communion. They are also connected in the overall establishment of the public sphere. Warner implies that there is an oscillation possible between publics and counterpublics, depending on their historical, economic, and political context. In order words, what operates at the margins—whether counter-hegemonic or not—in one context, society, or period may be dominant in another. So a specific type of cultural production is not inherently critical or affirmative, but gains such properties within a context, within its circulation as discourse. For Warner, a public is precisely constituted through its reflexive circulation of discourse as that which makes a social space, i.e., a space shared by producers and readers alike. Significantly, both play an active part in the circuit of recognition and meaning, as opposed to the semiotic model of sender and receiver:

> No single text can create a public. Nor can a single voice, a single genre, even a single medium. All are insufficient to create the kind of reflexivity that we call a public, since a public is understood to be an ongoing space of encounter for discourse. Not texts themselves create publics, but the concatenation of texts through time. Only when a previously existing discourse can be supposed, and when a responding discourse can be postulated, can a text address a public.[3]

In this way, a magazine's discourse lies in its continuity and circulation—in the fact that it is not only read, but reread over time. Reading, and thus the importance of a particular contribution to a critical discourse—say, a given issue of magazine—is not only imminent and actual; it can also take place long after publication, and in another context, another country. So even when a critical essay is directed to an actuality—a specific event, debate, or exhibition—it is nonetheless directed towards the future, and to the imaginary in the shape of possible readers. Even if a magazine has a number of subscribers, and thus has given rather than potential readers, they nonetheless remain fictitious: one can only hope that they will read the essay, now or later, and one can only hope that they will find it useful, whether as information, instruction, or provocation.

It is through this imaginary address that a magazine produces its culture and its sense of community, always a potential one, even when the magazine is relatively well known (critical journals will often feel a certain familiarity with their readers, who tend to be mostly subscribers from a certain field or milieu). At the same time, the community

Judy Chicago, name change ad, Artforum, Oct. 1970.

of readers is constantly actualized at every moment of publication, at the instance of punctuation, where the coming community is now the becoming, and the inoperative hopefully operative. Certainly, in terms of numbers there is a counting of heads going on—how many bought the issue, how many renewed their subscription, but also how many institutions and

individuals placed or continued their ads.

Every writer of critique in the arts, in theory, or elsewhere attempts to contribute to existing discourse, expanding it, bending it, transforming it, or negating it. But this depends wholly on circulation—on the distribution, language, location, and powers of enunciation of the magazine the

The rotary shop routine at the printing press of Pravda, a leading Soviet daily, as seen on Jan. 8, 1982.

text is published in. It is not just a matter of the text itself, but also the boat it sails in on, with individual magazines having a very different reach and brief. An essay may be extremely insightful and groundbreaking, but it may not circulate widely or become influential due to its very place of publication. We can be constructive and call this an ecosystem of writers and magazines within the arts, or we can take a more sinister view and simply state that it is a hierarchy. Furthermore, it not only matters where a text is published, but also *when*: a text can be extremely insightful and groundbreaking, but it may not circulate widely or become influential due to its exact time of publication. Even if many great texts have been rediscovered later, the undiscovered must surely outnumber the discovered?

Within the culture of magazines, we are thus dealing with several, if interconnected, forms of circulation. The critical and theoretical discourse of a magazine is circulated among its writers and readers, creating an imaginary community brought together by certain texts and images.

This shared discourse is continuous, and is dependent on being recurrent—a magazine needs some sort of reliability in its cycles of publication to sustain its community and position. A magazine also needs objectives in terms of how it imagines its contribution to the overall permeable discourse that is contemporary art—as addition, modification, criticism, or even social change. And of course, there is circulation in the economic sense; even in the most romantic notion of a magazine as a republic of letters, there is an inherent connection to capital. This goes for virtually all forms of cultural production, whether critical of capital or not.

A magazine thus circulates discourse, and is circulated as a commodity of knowledge. It does this through punctuality. The question thus arises of which punctuation it makes—since it is, after all, not just the release date we are thinking of, but the critical contribution to a discourse on art. We must thus now turn the page, and begin to peer inside the magazine. As already mentioned, the content and thus discursive production of a magazine can be found in all its texts and images—not just in the essays and reviews, but also in the announcements and ads. Seen as a totality, a magazine is a collection of texts and images of various kinds, and this collection involves both difference and repetition, making each issue distinct but simultaneously recognizable as part of a series. A magazine is never just one issue, one article, or one illustration, but one after the other, in a basic principle of addition, of this one *and* that one, and so on. A magazine is, in other words, a form of assemblage that can be described as montage.

From the communist film forms of Sergei Eisenstein, to Hollywood's capitalization of pictures, to Jean-Luc Godard's political deconstructions, montage has been a fixture of filmmaking, whether to create continuity or discontinuity, dialectics or antagonisms. However, montage can also be used to describe modern as well as postmodern artistic usages of collage, and of word and image, from Heartfield to Rosler, Kruger, and beyond. Indeed, silent cinema always juxtaposed images with text, and Godard of course made words into, or at least equal to, images (that is, as neither supportive nor narrativizing). Jacques Rancière has called this type of work *sentence-images*: "By sentence-image I intend the combination of two functions that are to be defined aesthetically—that is, by the way in which they undo the representable relationship between text and image."[4]

Now, in an art magazine, the relationship between text and image is supposedly fixed: there are images, even if these are mostly textual, as in works of conceptual art; and then there are texts about these images, these works of art. Even if the primary discourse-production of a magazine occurs through the texts it publishes, it is the images and artworks that are primary, suggesting a hierarchical relationship. We can even say that a magazine performs a service for its readers, for art, and arguably for its

advertisers, even if the latter is undisclosed and unacknowledged. Certainly the relation of power between writers and artists is highly contested, with many critics seeing themselves as mediators and facilitators, but many artists seeing critics as privileged and too powerful.

Even if the economics of these relations are complicated and somewhat invisible, this is not the only complication—indeed, there are phenomenological aspects of magazine-making that disrupt and contradict this traditional, and dare I say clichéd, relationship between a primary and a secondary production of meaning. A magazine may review artistic production, but in doing so it always presents *newly produced* texts alongside *reproduced* images—making the texts primary and the artworks secondary. And then there is the absence of images—some journals may have very few or no images at all, even when writing about image production. Whereas this may at first glance appear to be a gesture of disrespect toward artists and the making of art, this is not necessarily the case: the text may still posit itself as being in service to certain types of art-making, and may perhaps add power to the image through its absence—after all, isn't any reproduction a disservice to the aura of the original? Could we not, overtly polemically, perhaps, claim that *re*production is always already a *mis*representation? In other words, the relationship between texts and images in magazines is not a stable one; it is always done and undone by the particular combination that is presented by a publication. A magazine is, in this sense, a sort of sentence-image, a form of montage.

It is impossible to think of a magazine as montage without considering its graphic design. In a sense, we could say that the historical form of layout, with its clear separations between pages and categories, texts and images, is an attempt to stabilize and fix the unruly combinatory logics of Rancière's sentence-image, with its potential undoing of the relation of representation between word and picture. In the mode of address of a magazine, it is not just the writing style that indicates the situating of subjects and objects, and their interrelation, but also the design, as both are a matter of style *and* discourse simultaneously, or what we could call *a discursive style*. Discourse not only circulates as language, as linguistic meaning, but also as signs of discursivity, signs of a specific discourse, which place the addressor, and, it is hoped, the addressee within a circuit of recognition. Style positions the magazine, and thus its subjects and objects, from writers to readers and all the positions in between, always making a claim for plurality, for addition: another text, another artist, another reader. This is the principle of the "and."

Montage is, then, also a form of the circulation of texts and images, as Georges Didi-Huberman has noted in the case of the latter. In his historiography of images, Didi-Huberman consistently discusses montage as a technique for dealing with the essentially dual system of images, which are both fact and fetish, archive and

Top: Michael Maranda, ARTFORUMx, 2012. Bottom: Sergei Eisenstein, montage structure of a sequence from Alexander Nevsky, 1939.

appearance. Interestingly, the image as montage—as in a sequence, dialectic, or clash—is an ethical and political way of dealing with images, as opposed to the idea of the image as a manipulative lie that we find in discussions of the ethics of not showing or not looking at things that must remain unrepresentable (as Didi-Huberman writes in relation to the four surviving photographs from Auschwitz).[5] Instead of the route of negation, Didi-Huberman locates ethics in the ability to circulate and compare, in the way that an image can never stand alone, but is always preceded and followed by other images that it stands in dialogue with—as in the case of montage: "The image is neither nothing, nor all, nor is it one—it is not even two. It is deployed according to the minimum complexity supposed by two points of view that confront each other under the gaze of a third."[6]

And this notion of montage, as an ethical response to moments of crisis and the writing of history, can be illustrative for the work of a magazine—its role, too, is that of a continuous montage where you can contribute, contrast, critique, and circulate information and discourse. A critical magazine is always the politics of the *and*, positioning itself in regards to a number of confrontations and comings-together, always placing one or more things and ideas in relation to one another. But a relation is more than placing one thing after another; it is also the *and*

Johann Peter Hasenclever, The Reading Room, 1843. Oil on canvas. 71 x 100 cm.

itself. A magazine is a connector as well as a producer, and how it connects one or more points is central to its work, to the connection of its connection. Indeed, Gilles Deleuze—also referencing Godard's montage work, as both Rancière and Didi-Huberman do—makes an interesting observation about the *and*: "What counts … isn't two or three or however many, it's AND, the conjunction AND."[7] In Deleuze, the *and* is not merely a component part of a collection of images; rather, it marks a separate, if wholly dependent, connection that is the in-between and the border, an almost imperceptible line around which revolutions and something new can take place. It is this entity—the line, the connector—that montage makes visible. However, this interstice "is not an operation of association, but of differentiation" or "disappearance."[8] The images—or for that matter texts, as well as texts and images—that are conjoined and juxtaposed by montage are thus not purely associative or random. Instead, precision is required so that the "difference of potential is established," which will then, hopefully, "be productive of a third [image] or of something new."[9] In this sense, editing is montage, but of a particular kind: namely, montage that makes new connections and

brings forth hidden potentials of meaning about art, theory, and its place in the world. Paraphrasing Deleuze's definition of the politics of montage in Godard, the magazine as montage does not merely illustrate the world. It also somehow restores our belief in it.

Now, it may seem ridiculous to place such high hopes on magazine culture. How can one possibly expect art magazines to restore our faith in the world, when their world is increasingly the art world, with its strange confluence of symbolic and real capital, where the market, not criticism, sets the agenda, and where most reviews and essays in art magazines are indistinguishable from press releases and catalogue essays? There are, in my view, two ways of dealing with this issue. One is to reframe the question. If a text is a statement towards, within, and through a discourse—as in Michel Foucault's notion of a discursive formation—then this text always already exists within a circulation of texts and images.[10] In other words, a theoretical or critical essay is a statement that does not stand in a hierarchical relation to artworks per se, but rather in parallel to them: the works state one thing, and the texts another. Sometimes the works and the texts

18

occupy the same position, and sometimes they are in conflict, creating a polemical relationship. There is thus no principal separation between the critical and the polemic, and no inherent hierarchy or function of service. Rather, any possible superiority or subordination is dependent on the position of the speaker and the institutional inscription. The power of enunciation does not lie only in the statement, but also in the position from which it is uttered, and, indeed, in how and where it circulates.

The most wide-ranging attempt at creating a discursive formation of art-related magazines that was both formalized and continuous through addition and montage was the Documenta 12 magazine project of 2007. The central ideas of the project were exchange and circulation, in the shape of a server where all of the hundreds of participating magazines were able to upload essays that could, in turn, be downloaded and reprinted free of charge by the other magazines. Here, like in montage, a technical device provided the actual interstice, while the "montaging" was to be done by the magazines themselves. This would, it was hoped, create a global network of collaborating and exchanging magazines that would circulate discourses together, well beyond the event of Documenta itself. This promise was never fulfilled, partly because Documenta scandalously would not allow the magazines to use the server after the event ended, and partly because of a perceived hierarchy of knowledge, influence, and distribution. Whereas certain magazines, mainly in Southeast Asia, circulated texts and exchanged methods of dealing with language, circulation, economics, and politics, others (particularly in Europe) did not. Some of the latter were wary of Documenta itself as a hegemonic mega-institution and feared co-optation, while others were mostly concerned with their degree of representation within Documenta and felt a certain competitiveness towards the other participating magazines. In either case, they felt the need to be protective of their contributions to discourse, to their own production of knowledge. So people pulled back from the project. They exited. They *withdrew*. This is the second way of dealing with the diminishing role of magazines in relation to the art market, and it will be taken up in the second part of this essay.

X

Simon Sheikh is a curator and writer who researches practices of exhibition-making and political imaginaries. He is Reader in Art and Programme Director of the MFA in Curating at Goldsmiths, University of London, London. Sheikh was coordinator of the Critical Studies Program at Malmö Art Academy, Malmö from 2002 to 2009. He was also curator at NIFCA, Helsinki, 2003–2004 and, prior to that, director of Overgaden—Institute for Contemporary Art, Copenhagen from 1999–2002. Between 1996 and 2000, he was editor of the magazine *Øjeblikket* and a member of the project group GLOBE from 1993–2000. His recent curatorial work includes: *Reading / Capital (for Althusser)*, DEPO, Istanbul, 2014; *Unauthorized*, Inter Arts Lab, Malmö, 2012; *All That Fits: The Aesthetics of Journalism*, QUAD, Derby, 2011 (with Alfredo Cramerotti); *Do You Remember the Future?*, TOK / Project Loft Etagi, Saint Petersburg, 2011; *Vectors of the Possible*, BAK, basis voor actuele kunst, Utrecht, 2010; and *Capital (It Fails Us Now)*, UKS, Oslo, 2005 and Kunstihoone, Tallinn, 2006. Sheikh's writings can also be found in such periodicals as *Afterall*, *an architecture*, *Open*, *Springerin*, and *Texte zur Kunst*. He has edited and authored several publications, including: *On Horizons: A Critical Reader on Contemporary Art* (with Maria Hlavajova and Jill Winder) (2011); *Capital (it fails us now)* (2006); *In the Place of the Public Sphere?* (2005); *Knut Åsdam. Speech. Living. Sexualities. Struggle.* (2004); and *We are all Normal* (with Katya Sander) (2001).

1
Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 94.

2
Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude* (New York: Semiotexte), 2004, 70.

3
Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 90.

4
Jacques Rancière, *The Future of the Image* (London: Verso, 2007), 46.

5
Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in Spite of All* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

6
Ibid., 151.

7
Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 44.

8
Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 179.

9
Ibid.

10
Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 31–39 and 88–117.

Ahmet Oğüt

CCC: Currency of Collective Consciousness

A Personal Prologue

I grew up in a place where civil war was part of daily life, where safety in public space was divided into day and night, into wide roads and back streets, mountains with cages or fields with burned trees. It was normal to have military tanks patrolling in the heart of town with heavily armed Special Forces. Working as a journalist in a newspaper was dangerous enough to have one assassinated in the middle of the street during daytime. Listening to music in your native language was considered a crime. Imagine a place where primary school kids were investigated for taking part in a painting competition about the International Day of Peace. Growing up in circumstances of radically militarized everyday life with very limited resources, I am not coming from a place where worldviews of "Western moralism"or ethics as "conventional wisdom" were taken for granted. I am coming from a place where I learned the importance of consciousness—more importantly, collective consciousness—when one is isolated both culturally and politically.

Already during the early years of my artistic practice, I had to face a number of polarizing challenges. I remember participating in two significant meetings on April 2 and 9, 2005, in Istanbul with other artists, writers, critics, and students to discuss the notion of a national exhibition, with reference to several exhibitions that had been organized since 2000. Exhibitions about Istanbul, Turkey, and the Balkans, and more specifically the exhibition that was planned to open at Martin-Gropius-Bau (2005) in Berlin, were discussed at these meetings. At the end of them, ten artists—myself, Can Altay, Hüseyin Alptekin, Halil Altındere, Memed Erdener, Gülsün Karamustafa, Neriman Polat, Canan Şenol, Hale Tenger, and Vahit Tuna—decided to withdraw from this exhibition. In addition, an interview by Erden Kosova and Vasıf Kortun, and an article by Fulya Erdemci, were withdrawn from the exhibition catalog by the authors. The show went on, but it became an exhibition about Istanbul without the participation of artists from Istanbul (with a few exceptions). Through this withdrawal we expressed our fatigue over exhibitions based on national identity, over the utilization of artists as illustrations of politics between nations, and the categorization of artists according to geographical, national, or regional specifications. Besides all this, another disappointing thing was the disparity in the distribution of funds among invited artists.

Propositions

As the 19th Biennale of Sydney, 31st São Paulo Biennial, 10th Sharjah Biennial, 13th Istanbul Biennial, Manifesta 10, Gwangju Biennale, and many other cases attest to, we have entered a new phase: the existing institutional protocols and structures of large-scale exhibitions can't

handle the changing nature of spectatorship, sponsorship, usership, and government involvement in art exhibitions.

It is time to talk about what can be done before we hit a dead end, or simply a moment of crisis. What tools can be used? Who pays a greater price? I have a feeling that we lose a lot of time with satirical speculations, misconceptions, and a misguided focus on the wrong questions. We all often face contradictions. As artists, curators, social agents, cultural workers, writers, academics, organizers, students, and museum directors, we constantly need to ask ourselves how much we are willing to compromise while creating the conditions for art's production.

Our failure is that we often think that simply addressing or criticizing the contradictions is enough. We should start confronting them by inventing ways of reversing the cycle of structural contradictions, as Hito Steyerl explains in her lecture performance "Is the Museum a Battlefield" (2013).[1] Steyerl traces the bullets back to their manufacturer. She ends up in a feedback loop. The bullet manufacturer is a major sponsor of a Chicago museum where her artwork has been screened. How do we reverse the loop of circulation? We might say: through sabotage. What kind of sabotage are we talking about? Gayatri Spivak uses the term "affirmative sabotage"—not to destroy but to repurpose and use tools for something else.[2] Franco "Bifo" Berardi uses the term "algorithmic sabotage," referring to counter-strategies of the precariat within the abstract sphere of finance.[3]

But how can all this be done? Janna Graham has proposed "para-sitic practice" as a counter to target practice.[4] Graham says that para-sitic activity is critical of institutional elitism through an antagonistic dialogue between individuals working in cultural institutions and the cultural workers who are invited or commissioned. Graham underlines the importance of the question, "When are we the parasites, and when are we the hosts?" Para-sitic practice aims at broad social transformation by taking advantage of the high profile of cultural institutions, using a "problem-posing" approach instead of a "banking" approach, as Paulo Freire described it: a method of teaching that emphasizes critical thinking for the purpose of liberation, as opposed to the idea of treating students as empty containers into which educators must deposit knowledge.[5]

At her keynote speech at the International Biennial Association conference in Berlin, Maria Hlavajova underlined the importance of Gerald Raunig's "instituent practice," which refers to the reformulated institutional critique introduced by artists such as Hans Haacke and Marcel Broodthaers.[6] Then Hlavajova posed this question: "How do we want to be governed and how do we govern?"[7] Instituent practice positions itself between governing and being governed through its emancipatory and radical project of "transforming the arts of governing." Its effect goes beyond the particular limitations of a single

A campground is set up at Cockatoo Island, the primary location of 19th Biennale of Sydney, March, 2014. Photo: Ahmet Oğüt.

field, and it has the potential to force structural change in the areas of patronage, law, the urban, and the control of public space.

Thinking of how to make all these concepts more effective, I would suggest the idea of the "Intervenor": an autonomous outside voice who nonetheless has the right to act within the institution. Intervenors could not only act within the walls of the white cube, but could also directly intercede when it comes to matters of communication, events, bureaucracy, administration, and even the office space itself.

It is not easy to talk about such an antagonistic position without putting it into practice. Let's imagine how this would work:

Intervenors could be artists, art workers, cultural workers, or academics who aren't normally part of the institutional decision-making mechanism, and who are aware of the sensitivities of the local context.

Intervenors would have an officially acknowledged agreement that protects their work from financial and political interference.

Intervenors would have a right to vet all forms of communication before they go public. This would include announcements, press conferences, events, and

statements.

Intervenors would act in a time-sensitive manner, and would be flexible in times of crisis; they would not act according to preprogrammed agendas, concepts, exhibition schedules, or locations.

Intervenors could leave when it is no longer possible to challenge the limits of structural change.

Intervenors would be the protagonists who go beyond symbolic and harmless institutionalized critical agency. They would intercede if the institution reacted in an authoritarian or judgmental way to any public concerns.

Magnetic Moments of Collective Consciousness

To get an objective overview, it is essential to continually reframe discussions taking place in the arts community by moving from the abstract back to the concrete. When we look back at history, what comes into focus is the collective consciousness that emerges during what Ute Meta Bauer has called "magnetic moments in time."[8] In order to focus on the consequences of collective acts of refusal, we may now pass over to cases such as Charles Saatchi's resignation from the Tate's Patrons of New Art Committee, shortly after the opening of Hans Haacke's exhibition at the Tate Gallery in 1984[9]; or when the Cincinnati Art Center's director Dennis Barrie found himself in an obscenity trial because of Robert Mapplethorpe's "The Perfect Moment" exhibition.[10]

Alongside these individual cases, we can trace the evolution of the collective concerns of international arts communities over the years by looking at a few examples from the last half century. Starting in 1950, the Irascibles, a group of American abstract artists, including most of the leading figures of the New York School such as Louise Bourgeois, Robert Motherwell, Willem de Kooning, and Ad Reinhardt, signed an open letter to Roland J. McKinney, the president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, demanding an improvement in the presentation of abstract art in the museum.[11] The Irascibles' protest eventually brought change to the museum's plans for upcoming exhibitions. A few years later, another open letter addressing the architecture of the Guggenheim was published by a group of artists and sent to the museum prior to its construction (1956–58). This time, the case concerned where the art was to be shown. Many artists and critics reacted negatively when Frank Lloyd Wright's plans became public knowledge. The collectively written letter was addressed to James Johnson Sweeney, director of the museum. It stressed that plans for a spiral walkway and curvilinear slope were "not suitable for the display of painting and sculpture." The letter was signed by twenty-one artists such as Franz Kline, Robert Motherwell, Philip Guston, and Willem de Kooning.

Alongside the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, many mega-events of the art community, such as the 35th Venice Biennale in 1968, were struck by protests. The event was characterized by brutal police crackdowns, unfinished pavilions, and artist boycotts. Workers, trade unions, students, intellectuals, and artists united in a coalition on an unprecedented scale. Artists from many different countries took part in the protests by covering up their works or turning them over.[12]

The history of collective consciousness was elevated to another level when the Art Workers' Coalition—a coalition of artists, filmmakers, writers, critics, and museum staff that formed in New York in 1969—submitted a letter outlining thirteen demands to Bates Lowry, director of the Museum of Modern Art. The letter demanded museum reform and a better understanding of artistic positions and public concerns in the decision-making process.[13]

In 1972, ten artists cosigned an open letter to the expressing concerns about Szeemann's curatorial vision for Documenta 5. Daniel Buren and Robert Smithson's essays and Robert Morris's letter of withdrawal published in the catalog argued against the artist's loss of autonomy when the curator becomes author and "exhibition maker," imprisoned by contextual and cultural determinations. They were also concerned that the gap between artistic and curatorial authorship was not left open to negotiation on ethical or moral grounds.

Among other historical cases, the "No" campaign at the 10th São Paulo Biennale in 1969 ("Non à la Biennale de São Paulo") was the first large-scale organized campaign. It was initiated by a statement from a group of international artists that included Douglas Huebler, Joseph Kosuth, Robert Barry, and Lawrence Weiner. The statement denounced the brutality of the Brazilian military regime of Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969–74), and more specifically the violence perpetrated against Brazilian artists and intellectuals. The protest gained a large following and included many Brazilian artists such as Hélio Oiticica, Lygia Clark, Rubens Gerchman, Willys de Castro, Nelson Leirner, Mary Vieira, Antonio Dias, and Carlos Vergara. This campaign reverberated over the next few São Paulo biennials until political changes became apparent in Brazil in the 1980s.

Once again, only a few days prior to the opening, the 2014 São Paulo Biennial faced objections from sixty-one participating artists, who published a collective opposition letter on August 28, this time because of the Israeli funding of the event. The letter appealed to the biennial board to remove the Israeli sponsor logo and return the money. The day after the letter was delivered, Charles Esche, one of curators of the biennial, shared a joint curator's statement in support of the artists and their position. The Fundaçao Bienal São Paulo eventually agreed to add a note above the logo to "clearly disassociate" Israeli funding from the general sponsorship

This open letter to Roland L. Redmond, dated May 20, 1950, appeared on the front page of the Times on May 22, 1950. The American abstract artists who had signed the letter to the president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art were rejecting the museum's exhibition American Painting Today (1950) and boycotting the competition. Photo: Wikicommons.

of the exhibition.[14] Even though the foundation didn't remove the logo from the wall or return the money, this was an example of achieving consensus in a moment when it looked like it wouldn't have been possible; all the artists remained in the show.

During the same month, on August 18, 2014, the president of the Gwangju Biennale Foundation, Lee Yong-woo, announced his resignation over a controversy surrounding a political painting by Hong Seong-dam that was rejected for the exhibition "Sweet Dew 1980 and After," which celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Gwangju Biennale.[15] His resignation followed the resignation of the exhibition's head curator, Yoon Beom-mo, on August 10. Japanese artists from Okinawa also withdrew their artworks from the exhibition on August 11, stressing that the protection of the freedom of artistic expression aligns with the spirit of the Gwangju Biennale, which was founded in memory of the democratization movement of the 1980s.

I was one of the invited artists who took part in a conditional withdrawal from the 19th Biennale of Sydney in 2014. The biennial experienced weeks of controversy over links between the event and its founding sponsor, Transfield, an Australian multinational corporation that had secured a $1.22 billion contract in January 2014 to work on Manus Island and the Nauru Mandatory Detention Centers. Under Australian law, any asylum-seeker arriving in the country without a visa can be detained indefinitely, which contradicts the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. On February 19, forty-six participating artists issued an open letter calling for the board to "act in the interests of asylum-seekers" and "withdraw from the current sponsorship arrangements with Transfield." The board's response was intransigent: "Without Transfield," it explained, "the Biennale of Sydney would cease to exist." On February 26, five artists—Libia Castro, Olafur Olafsson, Charlie Sofo, Gabrielle de Vietri, and myself—withdrew from the biennial. We were joined by four more artists on March 5: Agnieszka Polska, Sara van der Heide, Nicoline van Harskamp, and Nathan Gray. Exhibition installers Diego Bonetto and Peter Nelson walked off the job over the issue.

In the meantime, other major sponsors of the 19th Biennale of Sydney, such as the city of Sydney, began to question the event's relationship with Transfield. On March 4, the issue was raised in the Australian parliament, with Green Party senator Lee Rhiannon making a motion in support of the artists. The motion was defeated by the major parties. Perhaps in response to the ongoing controversy, Transfield shares dropped 9 percent over this week, after an initial 21 percent rise when the contracts were first announced. On March 7, just fourteen days before the opening, Luca Belgiorno-Nettis made the decision to step down as chair of the biennial (a position he had held for over fourteen years) and the board announced that it was severing it forty-four-year-old ties with Transfield, the company that founded the biennial in 1973. After our demand was met, seven of the nine artists who had withdrawn from the biennial reentered.[16]

Since then there has been a chain of consequences: Senator George Brandis has threatened to withdraw government funding from arts organizations that reject corporate sponsorship. After the recent removal of Transfield Holdings' shares from Transfield Services, now the Belgiorno-Nettis family may return as sponsors, although both companies still share the same name and logo. As Angela Mitropolous has said, "A clear and unequivocal statement from the Biennale would clear up the confusion" about its sponsors. "Any confusion continues to be for the benefit of Transfield Services."[17]

Despite the confusions or complexities, the crucial questions are in fact quite simple: How do art institutions face social and ethical responsibilities towards the public, their collaborators, art workers, and artists when it comes to the source of their finances? Where can artistic

consciousness meet institutional consciousness?

Misconceptions

Financial decision-making and conceptual decision-making are often separated when it comes to social and ethical responsibilities towards the public. Patronage is often confused with programming the museum. Exhibition and education programs often serve corporate interests.

What are the vital parameters for a biennial to exist? Maintaining credibility and trust is crucial. Usership, spectatorship, and access to Culture (with a capital C) should not be constructed by the cultural elite alone. Therefore, we should ask ourselves several questions before deciding to get involved in biennials: Are biennials still pedagogic sites with transformative aims that can have a lasting effect on civil society? Or are they part of the neoliberal capitalist idea of "festivalism," which is more concerned with scale, budget, number of visitors, and branding? Do they prioritize public concerns and political autonomy, or are they concerned mainly with profit? Can they act as an intermediary between funding and critical politics, without ethical compromises? Do they truly support social struggles instead of whitewashing them? Do they seek out creative strategies and challenging diplomatic solutions when faced with conflicts and contradictions? Are biennials about providing a space, or becoming a space? How does one maintain self-criticality in the face of institutional elitism? How do we avoid confusing cultural heritage with personal conflicts, and how do we distinguish sponsorship from ownership?

The question of ownership goes along with the question of who has the right to "use the surplus." Inspired by Henri Lefebvre's iconic text on "the right to the city," which demands "a transformed and renewed access to urban life,"[18] David Harvey has focused on the "use of the surplus" in current debates around the collective power to reshape urbanization. As Harvey explains, "The right to the city is constituted by establishing greater democratic control over the production and use of surplus."[19] In 2001, Brazil became the first country to introduce a federal policy that wrote the "right to the city" into law, ensuring "democratic city management" and "the prioritization of use value over exchange value." Biennials, which carry ample meaning for the cities in which they take place, need to be aware of the great importance of negotiating and safeguarding sites of absolute freedom of expression from political manipulation and corporate interference.

Between Joint Action and Campaign

Let's look at what happened in Chile in 1988. After ruling for sixteen years, Augusto Pinochet was deposed with a

Chile, la alegría ya viene, 1988. 72.9 x 51.7 cm. Copyright: Archivo de Fondos y Colecciones, Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos.

56 percent "No" vote in a plebiscite. After so many years of living without democracy, it wasn't an easy task to convince Chileans to pick an alternative. Many were afraid to vote against Pinochet, thinking it might cause them to be targeted. In the final weeks leading up to the vote, each side was given fifteen minutes of TV advertising time every night. The pro-Pinochet side used this as propaganda, warning that any alternative would lead to an apocalyptic future. Meanwhile, the "No" campaign, led by a coalition of opposition parties, convened a focus ground spearheaded by Genaro Arriagada. They decided to do the opposite of what the Pinochet campaign had done. Despite other political interests (involving American consultants and the Soros Foundation, among others[20]), the ad campaign was positive and joyful. It resonated better than a typical far-left campaign that might have focused on Pinochet's human rights violations. Arriagada and his focus group acted as mediators and worked for years to build bridges between seventeen different groups. Pinochet had the support of the upper class, the business community, the police force, and the army. The "No" campaign had the support of students, workers, human rights activists,

A meeting between artists and curators at the 31st Biennale de São Paulo on August 30, 2014, took place while the Fundação Bienal São Paulo was delivering their first response. Photo: Ahmet Öğüt.

victims of Pinochet's violent regime, many political parties, and the people in the streets.

We can also look at what happened to Ghader Ghalamere. On Thursday, April 10, 2014, Ghalamere, fearing persecution in his home country of Iran, faced deportation from Sweden. While waiting in the departure lounge, he and his family explained the situation to other passengers preparing to board the flight. Once on the plane, all the passengers refused to fasten their seat belts. This collective protest prevented the plane from taking off. Since the flight was unable to take off as scheduled, Ghalamere was removed from the plane and was granted a temporary reprieve.[21] The beauty behind this incident tells us a lot about how, when faced with a moment of crisis, a joint action in a constructive and collective manner with clever timing can have a significant effect.

Towards a Collective Epilogue

There is an important difference between the meanings of "boycott" and "withdrawal," or "campaign" and "propaganda." When we use these words, we should learn how to avoid getting lost in polemics, cynicism, metadiscourses, complexity, and complicity. Withdrawal is an act of disconnection when there is no space left for dialogue. It might appear publicly as a call to act in solidarity, or as a quiet gesture of nonparticipation with personal consequences. Boycotting can also be used when necessary, keeping in mind that it is only one among the 198 methods in Gene Sharp's guide to nonviolent action.[22] Ekaterina Degot reminds us that subversive positions are fragile and context-dependent, and timing is everything.[23] Artists and other cultural workers are fragile when acting alone, facing more personal consequences. After every radical and transformative act, heavy aftershocks might resonate for a long time, which might puzzle us. Finding a strategy is not only about choosing which method is to be used. The lost or not-yet-discovered blueprint is hidden somewhere between a joint action with clever timing and masterminding a long-term campaign. To push and challenge the limits of structural change in a progressive manner today, we need figures like Intervenors who have a right to intercede as turnaround strategists and antagonistic negotiators. Intervenors could mediate in those moments and challenge top-down decision-making, repurposing it in real time.

X

Ahmet Öğüt (born in 1981 in Diyarbakır, Turkey) is a sociocultural initiator, artist, and lecturer who lives and works in Istanbul, Berlin, and Amsterdam. Working across a variety of media, Oğüt's institutional solo exhibitions include Forward!, Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven (2015); Happy Together: Collaborators Collaborating, Chisenhale Gallery, London (2015); Apparatuses of Subversion, Horst-Janssen-Museum, Oldenburg (2014); Stacion – Center for Contemporary Art Prishtina (2013); Künstlerhaus Stuttgart (2012); SALT Beyoglu, Istanbul (2011); The MATRIX Program at the UC Berkeley Art Museum (2010); Künstlerhaus Bremen (2009); and Kunsthalle Basel (2008). He has also participated in numerous group exhibitions, including the 8th Shenzhen Sculpture Biennale (2014); Performa 13, the Fifth Biennial of Visual Art Performance, New York (2013); the 7th Liverpool Biennial (2012); the 12th Istanbul Biennial (2011); Trickster Makes This World, Nam June Paik Art Center (2010); the New Museum Triennial, New York (2009); and the 5th Berlin Biennial for Contemporary Art (2008). Ogüt has completed several residency programs, including at the Delfina Foundation and Tate Modern

(2012); IASPIS, Sweden (2011); and Rijksakademie van Beeldende Kunsten, Amsterdam (2007–2008). He has taught at the Dutch Art Institute, Netherlands (2012); the Finnish Academy of Fine Arts, Finland (2011–2014); and Yildiz Teknik University, Turkey (2004–2006), among others. Oğüt was awarded the Visible Award for the Silent University (2013); the special prize of the Future Generation Art Prize, Pinchuk Art Centre, Ukraine (2012); the De Volkskrant Beeldende Kunst Prijs 2011, Netherlands; and the Kunstpreis Europas Zukunft, Museum of Contemporary Art, Germany (2010). He co-represented Turkey at the 53rd Venice Biennale together with Banu Cennetoğlu (2009).

1
Hito Steyerl, "Is the Museum a Battlefield," 2013. Filmed live at the 13th Istanbul Biennial and Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin https://vimeo.com/76011774.

2
Gayatri Spivak, *An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

3
Interview with Franco "Bifo" Berardi, "Tankefaran," special English-language issue, *Brand* 1 (2013) http://tidningenbrand.se/brand/nummer-1-2013-tankefaran/ .

4
Janna Graham, "Target Practice vs. Para-sites," presented at Gare du Nord, Basel, November 7, 2012.

5
Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1970).

6
Gerald Raunig, "Instituent Practices: Fleeing, Instituting, Transforming," *Transversal*, Jan. 2006 http://eipcp.net/transversal/0106/raunig/en .

7
Maria Hlavajova,"Why Biennial? *,*" keynote address, First General Assembly of the International Biennial Association at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt, July 10–14, 2014, Berlin.

8
Interview with Ute Meta Bauer, "Magnetic Moments in Time," *Echo Gone Wrong* , Dec. 20, 2013 http://www.echogonewrong.com/interview-from-latvia/magnetic-moments-in-time-maya-mikelsone-in-conversation-with-ute-meta-bauer-and-ahmet-ogut-about-art-education/ .

9
Hans Haacke, Seth Kim-Cohen, Yve-Alain Bois, Douglas Crimp, Rosalind Krauss, *October: The First Decade* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

10
See Cynthia L. Ernst's selected links and bibliography of the Robert Mapplethorpe obscenity trial (1990) http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mapplethorpelinks.html .

11
"The Irascibles," *Life*, Jan. 15, 1951. The open letter was published on May 22, 1950 in the *New York Times.*

12
Vittoria Martini, "A brief history of *I Giardini* : Or a brief history of the Venice Biennale seen from the Giardini," *Art and Education.*

13
Lucy R. Lippard, "The Art Workers' Coalition: Not a History," *Studio International* 180 (Nov. 1970): 171–72.

14
Mostafa Heddaya, "São Paulo Biennial Removes General Israeli Sponsorship," *Hyperallergic*, Sept. 1, 2014 http://hyperallergic.com/146449/sao-paulo-biennial-removes-general-israeli-sponsorship/ .

15
"Gwangju Biennale Foundation's President resigns in controversy over satirical painting of President Park Geun-hye," biennialfoundation.org, Aug. 19, 2014 http://www.biennialfoundation.org/2014/08/president-of-the-gwangju-biennale-foundation-yongwoo-lee-resigns/ .

16
Ahmet Oğüt and Zanny Begg, "The Biennale of Sydney: A Question of Ethics and the Arts," *Broadsheet Magazine* , 2014.

17
Steve Dow, "Sydney Biennale 2016: Belgiorno-Nettis family may be back as sponsors," *The Guardian* , Dec. 1, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/dec/02/sydney-biennale-2016-belgiorno-nettis-family .

18
Henri Lefebvre, *Le Droit à la ville* (Paris: Anthropos, 1968).

19
David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (New York: Verso, 2013).

20
Olga Khazan, "4 Things the Movie 'NO' Left Out About Real-Life Chile," *The Atlantic*, Mar. 29, 2013 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/4-things-the-movie-no-left-out-about-real-life-chile/274491/ .

21
Adam Withnall, "Refugee facing deportation from Sweden saved by fellow passengers refusing to let plane leave," *The Independent*, Apr. 14, 2014 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-facing-deportation-from-sweden-saved-by-fellow-passengers-refusing-to-let-plane-leave-9259085.html .

22
Gene Sharp, *Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Westford, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973).

23
Ekaterina Degot, "A Text That Should Never Have Been Written?," *e-flux journal* 56 (June 2014) https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60383/a-text-that-should-never-have-been-written/ .

Paolo Virno
Déjà Vu and the End of History

Watching Themselves Live [1]

When psychiatrists refer to déjà vu, they do not mean a known event of the past playing out again, accompanied by either euphoric amazement or bored condescension. Rather, here we have an only apparent repetition, one that is entirely illusory. We believe that we have already experienced (or seen, heard, done, etc.) something that is, in fact, happening for the first time at this very moment. We mistake the current experience for the very faithful copy of an original that never really existed. We believe that we are recognizing something of which we are only now cognizant. As such, we could also describe déjà vu in terms of "false recognition."

Déjà vu does not entail a defect of memory, nor its qualitative alteration. Rather, it means the untrammelled extension of memory's jurisdiction, of its dominion. Rather than limit itself to preserving traces of times past, memory also applies itself to actuality, to the evanescent "now." The instantaneous present takes the form of memory, and is re-evoked even as it is taking place. But what can "remembering the present" mean, except having the irresistible sensation of having already experienced it previously? Inasmuch as it is an object of memory, the "now" is camouflaged as the already-been, and is thus duplicated in an imaginary "back then," in a fictitious "other-then." It goes without saying that between the current event, considered a mere repeat, and the phantom original prototype, there is no mere analogy, but rather the most complete identity. The present and the pseudo-past, which have the same perceptual and emotional content, are indistinguishable. The consequence is a troubling one: every act and every word that I say and do *now* seems destined to repeat, step by step, the course that was fixed back then, without the possibility of omitting or changing anything. As Henri Bergson put it in "Le souvenir du Présent et la Fausse Reconnaissance": "*We feel that we choose* and will, but that we are choosing what is imposed on us and willing the inevitable."[2]

The state of mind correlated to déjà vu is that typical of those set on *watching themselves live*. This means apathy, fatalism, and indifference to a future that seems prescribed even down to the last detail. Since the present is dressed in the clothes of an irrevocable past, these people must renounce any influence on how the present plays out. It is impossible to change something that has taken on the appearances of memory. As such, they give up on action. Or, better, they become *spectators* of their own actions, almost as if these were part of an already-known and unalterable script. They are dumbfounded spectators, sometimes ironic and often inclined to cynicism. The individual at the mercy of the déjà vu is her own epigone. To her eyes, the historical scansion of events is suspended or paralyzed; the distinction between before and after, cause and effect, seems futile and even derisory.

Twin Eiffel Towers appear when seen from the Oculus Rift Google street viewer.

The phenomenon of "false recognition" allows us to decipher critically the fundamental idea of every philosophy of history: the end, the exhaustion, or the implosion of history itself. Above all, it allows us to settle accounts with the contemporary—that is, "postmodern"—version of this idea, which descends from a noble lineage and complicated family tree. According to Baudrillard and his miniature disciples, history thins out to the point of vanishing when the millenarian aspiration to wipe out the duration of time (and, with this, any irritating delays) appears to have been satisfied by the instantaneousness of information, real-time communications, and by the desire to lay "hold of things almost before they have taken place."[3] And yet the affirmation of an eternal present, a centripetal and despotic *actuality*, is provoked by déjà vu, namely by the form of experience in which there prevails—as Bergson put it—"the feeling that *the future is closed*, that the situation is detached from everything although I am attached to it."[4] In capricious, rampant years of history, Karl Mannheim prophesied:

> It is possible … that in the future, in a world in which there is never anything new, in which all is finished and each moment a repetition of the past, there can exist a condition in which thought is utterly devoid of all ideological and utopian elements.[5]

A posthistorical situation, then; but also, at the same time, a condition marked by the mnestic pathology of which we have already spoken: "there is never anything new … each moment [is] a repetition of the past."

Now, however, we need to interrupt this game of assonances and analogies. To understand the increasing fragility of historical experience and, at the same time, to refute the mediocre ideologies that set up camp on this

terrain, it is necessary to observe more closely the actual texture of "false recognition." What clay is a *memory of the present* made of? How is it formed? What does it reveal?

The Temporality of the Possible

It is in the past that we find the center of gravity of the temporality of potential. This is still something of an enigma, however. In order to illustrate its meaning and significance, it is worth asking ourselves, first of all, what past it concerns, and how the perennial "having been" of the virtual is articulated. This is nothing more than a morphological description, on the basis of which we can then address the important question: To what experience or way of being does such a "back then" correspond?

The past in which the possible is inscribed is neither recent nor remote: in "Le possible et le réel," Bergson speaks of a " *passé indéfini*," of an incalculable " *de tout temps*," a formless other-then.[6] And in "Le souvenir du présent," we read that in false recognition, the memory is never located at a specific point in the past, but rather in "the *past in general*." What is at issue here is not this or that former present, with its own unique countenance, but rather a simple "before" that cannot be circumscribed within any chronological order: "a past that has no date and can have none."[7] The past-in-general accompanies every actuality like an aura—without, though, itself having ever been actual. It is, therefore, the pure *form* of anteriority that is here at work. It is an *a priori* form, with the capacity to subordinate any experience whatsoever to itself: not just that which has already been, but also current experience and what is now to come. We ought to recognize that "a representation can bear the mark of the past independently of what it represents."[8]

If representation concerns a particular (dateable, defined) past, the past-form so closely adheres to its object that it goes almost unperceived. Conversely, where the "now" is depicted as the "back then" (namely, where we have a memory of the present) the past-in-general sticks out in sharp relief. The déjà vu is its epiphany. Moreover, the past-form also corresponds to the representation of the future. How? Whenever we adopt the future perfect tense of a verb, the future seems to be emptied out, locked away: "I will have enjoyed," "I will have had many opportunities," and so on. In all such cases, what does not yet exist is put behind us, and we include it in the past-in-general, making it a matter of memory. The future perfect is the *memory of what is to come*.[9]

Whatever the temporal location of the experience to which we are referring, the past-form always implies that the actual must step back in favor of the potential. An event that took place many years ago is "past" in a double sense: something that was perceived and something that was

Chris Marker, La Jetée (1962), film still.

remembered as it took place, a real "back then" and a virtual "back then," the chronologically situated past and the past-in-general. An event in the present, as we know, demonstrates its own enduring potential as soon as its image is anachronistically projected back onto the " *passé indéfini*." An event that takes place subsequently, *will have been possible*: contingency is inherent within future states of affairs (or rather, seems to be one of their salient traits) precisely and only because they also have a place in the past-in-general, have something of the *previous* about them, and are vested with memory.

In a well-known passage of his *Confessions*, Augustine writes:

> But even now it is manifest and clear that there are neither times future nor times past. Thus it is not properly said that there are three times, past, present, and future. Perhaps it might be said rightly that there are three times: a time present of things past; a time present of things present; and a time present of things future. For these three do coexist somehow in the soul, for otherwise I could not see them. The time present of things past is memory; the time present of things present is direct experience; the time present of

things future is expectation.[10]

And yet such a scansion, with its axis in the current present (the object of perception or "direct intuition"), speaks to the modality of the real, rather than to the modality of the possible. The past—or better, the indeterminate " *de tout temps*"—is preeminent with regard to the potentially existing. Paraphrasing Augustine, we ought speak of a *past of the past* (the old "memory of the present" now placed side-by-side with the perception of the present); of a *past of the present* (as arises in the déjà vu phenomenon); and a *past of the future* (the memory of what is to come, as established by what "will have been").

Language as the Indefinite Past

The past that was never actual, a "before" with no date, the pure form of the previous: such are the structural characteristics of the time pertaining to possibility. But such a morphological description is only one first step. The past-form is not, indeed, a mental abstraction

Aby Warburg, Altas Mnemosyne no. 39, 1926.

without exception, inclined to find familiar words strange. Their vocabulary is immobilized, stopping the phrase in its tracks: derailed from its habitual use, it comes into sharp relief, and produces a sort of echo. We are suddenly struck by certain among its material characteristics (the excess of vowels in "queue," for example), or by the obviousness of its etymology, or by a previously unnoticed homonymy. The familiar word is split in two: we use it to say something, but, at the same time, we put it in inverted commas, as if it were a quotation. It is *used* but also *mentioned*; perceived in its actuality, and together with this remembered as something virtual. On the one hand, the mention of the term—simultaneous to its use—situates what is being said in the past. On the other hand, its mention re-evokes the fact that it belongs to the infinite potential of language, restoring the *dictum* to the terms of the speakable, and referring the act of speaking back to the faculty that made it possible. On the one hand and the other: But is it really the case that two distinct aspects are at play here? Or are we talking about one and the same thing? On closer inspection, the mention of the familiar word pushes it back into the *passé indéfini* precisely insofar as it reassimilates it to language. And language is, in itself, the purely previous, an indeterminate other-then. The language faculty is the never-present "back then" to which what I now utter can always look back.

The Snobbery of Memory

This reflection on the two different forms of anachronism now allows us to formulate a detailed and sharp-pointed thesis that will not be blunted by too many nuances. More than a thesis, it is a guide-to-thought with which we can mount an offensive against certain theories and emotional inclinations that postulate the completion or collapse of the process of history.

The feeling of déjà vu, awakened by "false recognition," leads us to believe that even if we are faced with continuous change, everything is the same, everything is repeating itself. It goes without saying, however, that there would be no "false recognition" if it were not for "the memory of the present." Only where the virtual is in full flower right next to the actual could we ever illusorily confuse it for something that we have experienced already. The real anachronism makes use of materials that the formal anachronism puts at its disposal: and nothing else beyond them. As such, it uses its opposite as its own lever. But since "false recognition" conceals the genesis of historical time, the genesis that the "memory of the present," conversely, reveals and displays, to state that the former presupposes the latter has a consequence of some significance (here accorded the value of a "thesis"). Namely: *the "end of history" is an idea, or state of mind, that arises precisely when the very condition of possibility of history comes into view*; when the root of all historical activity is cast out onto the surface of historical becoming,

(possible to grasp by identifying what the countless particular pasts have in common), nor a mere psychological device. Nothing is less "formalistic" than this form: it does not limit itself to making its mark on many and varied representations, but also exhibits its own particular *mode of existence.* The past-in-general, beyond being a "how?," is also and above all a "what?": it refers to an aspect of existence, and is incarnated in an unavoidable concrete process. Our next task, then, consists in understanding what the past-in-general is, or—the same thing—in naming the potential nestled within it.

The past-in-general is, in the first place, language. Meaning: the phonetic, lexical, and grammatical system, which exists in the sense of an inexhaustible potential, a potential that is perennial because it is never exhausted or attenuated by the ensemble of its realizations. But the term "language" here has a more extensive—or less rigorous—meaning than Saussure gives it: it also indicates the general disposition towards articulated discourse, the very fact that we can speak. Here we are referring to the language faculty as such, not only the system of signs (*langue* in the strict sense, that is) that allows and mediates its exercise.

According to psychiatrists, people subject to déjà vu are,

and is evident as a phenomenon; when the *historicity* of experience is itself also manifested *historically*.

The best way to examine this guide-to-thought more closely is to put it to the test. That is, we ought to test the waters of its explanatory capacity and critical force in relation to an example text. In a long footnote to his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, Alexandre Kojève maintains that the exhaustion of history diagnosed by Hegel is no longer, in our epoch, some future eventuality, but rather is a *fait accompli*.[11] The industrial societies of the post-Second World War period, in this view, had now left behind the struggle against nature and the struggle for mutual recognition. Labor—that is, the opposition between Subject and Object—was losing weight and significance as automated production processes captured and subjugated nature in such measure as to allow for a stable relation with it. Similarly, politics—the search for the recognition of others by way of wars and revolutions—was also declining. The bloody conflicts of the last century represented only a "spatial extension" of the essential results achieved once and for all time by Robespierre and Napoleon. Also disappearing together with Labor and Politics is "Action in the strong sense of the term," which, rejecting "the given," was always seeking to establish a historically new world. But what forms of life prevail in post-historical societies? Kojève saw two of them, a pair that diverged and were even opposites.

On the one hand, the post-history in which we are supposedly immersed is explained as man "becoming an animal again." Rather than inhabiting a world with struggle and labor, the living being of the *Homo sapiens* species is now encapsulated in an *environment*, to which it adapts without any kind of friction. Certainly, even after the conclusion of the business of History, we will build houses and create works of art, but following the same impulse that leads a bird to make its nest or a spider to spin its web. Nothing like happiness is any longer in question: rather, "men will surely be *content* as a result of their *artistic*, *erotic,* and playful behavior inasmuch as, by definition, they will be contented with it." Also accounted for here is the "definitive disappearance of human discourse (*Logos*) in the strict sense." In its place, "vocal signals or sign 'language'" will proliferate, to which we would react by conditioned reflex: nothing much different from "what is supposed to be the 'language' of bees." In Kojève's view, the *American way of life*, in which the eternal present typical of an "environment" dominates, exemplifies well the condition of post-historical animals.

Another way of being also comes into view at the end of history, diametrically opposed to the one just sketched out. It is a matter of *snobbery*. That is to say, an affected attitude that shrinks from any utilitarian automatism and clashes with the "'animal' or 'natural' given." Though having nothing to do with Labor or "warlike and revolutionary Fights," the snob nonetheless maintains a separation between the *forms* and *contents* of his own

Jonathan Glazer, Under the Skin (2013), film still.

activity, such as to guarantee the former a marked independence from (and supremacy over) the latter. The unequalled model of this way of being is Japanese culture: there, indeed, Noh theatre, the tea ceremony, and the art of flower arranging have built up a widespread propensity to "live according to totally formalized values." No longer historical yet still human (the fracture between Subject and Object having been reinvented), Japanese snobbery, according to Kojève, alludes to a principle-hope of general applicability:

> While henceforth speaking in an *adequate* fashion of everything that is given to him, post-historical Man must continue to *detach* "form" from "content," doing so no longer in order actively to transform the latter, but so that he may *oppose* himself as a pure "form" to himself and to others taken as "content" of any sort.

Becoming an animal again, or else snobbery. The alternative proposed by Kojève is in many aspects akin to that with which we dealt in earlier: real anachronism or formal anachronism, false recognition or memory of the present. However, in order to make clear this consonance, we must call into question the conceptual schema within which Kojève inscribes his pair of opposed choices. And it attracts two principal objections.

First off, far from it playing a protagonist's role on the little stage of post-history, we could even say that snobbery constitutes the very quintessence of historical life. Its prerogative is to show the autonomy and exuberance of "forms" with respect to "contents": But what are this autonomy and exuberance, other than the *prerequisite* of Labor and Politics: in other words, "Action in the strong sense of the term"? Snobbery unveils the foundation of historical conflicts, since it devotes itself to representing, through a series of determinate acts, the contrast that generally exists between human action and "the given." Detaching "forms" from "contents," snobbery *factually* expresses the impossibility of any *fact* entirely realizing

the corresponding capacity-to-do. To put it another way: snobbery is a peculiar praxis that reflects in itself—and relentlessly exhibits—the historicity of every type of praxis (including "snobbish" praxis as well, of course). To attribute a post-historical character to the snob is a classic case of being blinded by too much light.

Secondly, "becoming an animal again" is not a biological fate, corresponding to the disappearance of any friction with nature. On the contrary, it is an existential possibility that reveals itself insofar as the gap with "the given" is exaggeratedly accentuated, becomes most visible, and is experienced *as such*. But this accentuation, as well as the visibility and direct experience of the gap with "the given," is the result of snobbery. As such, we must say that "becoming an animal again" is the existential possibility that reveals itself on the basis of the full affirmation of the snobbish lifestyle. For Kojève, the post-historical animal always adheres symbiotically to the "contents" of its action, while the snob distances himself from them, counterpoising to this the autonomy of "forms." But he is mistaken here. Such a symbiotic adherence would only be conceivable, in truth, if we supposed that *Homo sapiens* somersaulted into the immutable condition of the wolf or the ape; but if we did suppose such a somersault, the self-distancing subsequently operated by the snob would itself be inconceivable. On closer inspection, the fracture between the "forms" and "contents" of activity is at the basis of *both* modes of being. The division that separates and renders them antithetical is, rather, the following: the snob tries to live at the level of this fracture, understanding that the source of history is to be found within it; the post-historical animal, conversely, makes the overpopulation of forms into an *environment* at one remove, viscous and all-embracing, and *adapts* to its prescriptions in virtue of some (pseudo-)instinctive behavior. To use Kojève's example: the post-historical animal is he who reduces the most elaborate, affected aspects of the tea ceremony to an immediate "given." Precisely because they are detached from their natural "contents," and precisely because of their independence (and hypertrophy), "forms" are surreptitiously taken for a catalog of minute "contents"—and with this, their frictionless mutual penetration does indeed seem possible.

The post-historical animal and the snob do not limit themselves to coexisting spatially, each of them extraneous and refractory with regard to the other. Within the latter we can still make out the silhouette of the former, even if it has been disfigured and upended. The intimate relationship between these two contenders does not, however, blunt the contest itself. The antithesis between these two forms of life is all the more radical, indeed, the more they are based on identical premises and defined against the same background. This background is not, as Kojève supposes, the "end of history." On the contrary, the opposition between "becoming an animal again" and snobbery is resolved on the stage of a

A hermit crab hides in plain sight in a transparent shell designed by Robert DuGrenier.

hyper-historical epoch: the epoch in which, let us repeat, not only do we experience historical events, but we face up to the very thing that confers a historical tone on every event.

False recognition suits "becoming an animal again" very well. And the converse is also true: "becoming an animal again" announces itself first and foremost as false recognition. When today's potential is confused for an already-experienced act, which we are now constrained to copy unvaryingly, human praxis degenerates into repetitive, predetermined behavior patterns. To identify the faculty (capacity-to-do) with a list of specific performances (*faits accomplis*) carves out an environment for us within which any freedom from "the given" is imperceptible. It is clear, however, that this confusion and this identification would be impossible if the potential and the faculty had not acquired an autonomous significance thanks to the snobbish memory of the present. When we experience language through the prism of each concrete utterance, communication resembles a weft of "vocal signals or sign 'language,'" but, in experiencing it, we take it for an immense reservoir of *already*-spoken words, to be repeated and repeated again in correspondence with environmental stimuli. The impulse for happiness declines, and people are simply content (inasmuch as they are *contented* with their own behavior), when the disposition to enjoy pleasure appears as such—as distinct from a single actual pleasure—but, at the same time, it is equated (through "false recognition," indeed) with the sum of already-enjoyed pleasures.

The Modernariat

The excess of memory, which without doubt characterizes the contemporary situation, has a name: *the memory of the present*. This latter, rather than remaining a

Rita Hayworth poses infinitely in Orson Welles's 1947 Lady from Shanghai.

fundamental and yet hidden characteristic of the mnestic faculty, breaks through to the surface and is explicitly manifest. What is excessive is not per se the split in every instant between a perceived "now" and a remembered "now," but rather the fact that this split has become fully visible. To what do we owe such a radical disclosure? Perhaps to a pathological "lack of attention to life," as Bergson claims? Nothing of the kind. The memory of the present, whose peculiar function is precisely to represent the possible, presents itself unreservedly when the experience of the possible assumes a crucial importance in the fulfillment of life's tasks. It is the objective preeminence of the virtual in any given type of praxis that brings the mnestic mechanism openly into relief—in determining the temporality of the virtual, this mechanism opens the way to the virtual itself. The excess of memory *does not* induce lethargy and resignation, but on the

contrary guarantees the most intense alacrity.

The paralysis of action, often accompanied by an ironic disillusionment, derives above all from the inability to bear the experience of the possible. To put it another way, the effective cause of this paralysis is the overturning of the memory of the present in *false recognition*, which, as we know, reconfigures today's possible as a previously-existing real that we must now inevitably reiterate. Since the memory of the present is an explicit, pervasive phenomenon, even its direct negation—that is, false recognition—is immediately in evidence. Déjà vu is, indeed, a pathology: but, we must add, it is a *public* pathology.

In the contemporary situation, apparently in harmony with the plot of the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely*

35

Meditations, the overabundance of memory entails an overabundance of history. This does not, however, mean the maniacal (and asphyxiating) predominance of historiographical studies. The problem is something rather more extreme: the unprecedented proximity of every particular instance of action and suffering to history's conditions of possibility, namely what *historicizes* action and suffering *per se.*

In our epoch, the root of acting historically (the coexistence of, as well as the discrepancy between, potential and act) has acquired empirical and even pragmatic significance as a phenomenon. There is no work task today that does not require—if it is to be discharged in full—the exhibition of the generic psycho-physical disposition to produce (namely, labor-power), which goes beyond the task itself. Nor is there any effective, pertinent discourse today that, beyond communicating something, does not also have to demonstrate the speaker's linguistic competence pure and simple, namely the capacity-to-speak (language), which always exceeds the content that the communication happens to have. The formal anachronism thus also itself becomes a *public* mechanism, an inevitable requisite of production and discourse. The overabundance of history (connected to the overabundance of memory) points us to where human praxis is directly grappling with the difference between faculty and performance, which constitutes history's condition of possibility.

Nietzsche held that "at the point of a certain excess of history, life crumbles and degenerates—as does, ultimately, as a result of this degeneration, history itself, as well." We can here put our own name to this statement, on condition that the original meaning is altered. The idea of an "end of history" is *not* the consequence of excess, as Nietzsche hypothesizes, but rather the consequence of its obfuscation. It is also true, moreover, that this obfuscation presupposes a revelation: it concerns something (namely, the overabundance of history) on which our gaze is now fixed. Let us consider these two aspects more closely. The post-historical state of mind is awakened by the overturning of the (historicizing) formal anachronism in the *real anachronism*, which is symmetrically opposed to it. The real anachronism conceals the difference between potential and act (the foundation of historicity), thus reducing potential to a previous act, a faculty to past performances, and language to already-spoken words. Nonetheless, the radical difference between capacity-to-do and *faits accomplis* is subject to a transfiguration—one that conceals this difference—precisely and only when it comes to the fore, when it is empirically most dazzling. The real anachronism is based on the formal anachronism, attesting to its opposite as it clashes with and deforms it. The impression that the historical process is stuck ("history itself ... crumbles and degenerates") does indeed arise when human praxis stands closest to history's condition of

possibility ("a certain excess of history"), but it arises as a reaction that detracts from it, or what Dante called a *contrapasso*.

Here, we get to something else that perhaps ought to be counted among the many ways in which we can formulate the salient problem of the contemporary situation. Namely, learning to experience the memory of the present (or better, its explicit, pervasive character) as such, thus liberating it from the nemesis that degrades it into false recognition. Learning to experience the memory of the present means to attain the possibility of a *fully historical existence*. Such a possibility, if it is not incarnated in a set of habits—that is, in an ethos—will not remain neglected, ever-flickering on the horizon, but rather penetrates into its opposite, taking on the semblance of the "end of history." And that is what is happening today, in the main. Faced with the hyper-historicity of experience, postmodern ideology hurries to play the broken record of the déjà vu, simultaneously both sweet and gloomy. Everything has already been; history has fallen "into the order of the recyclable"; we are destined, for better or for worse, to "the massive recall, at every moment, of all the patterns of our life"[12]; every action has the status and the mannerisms of a quotation.

Making its mark on the contemporary public spirit, the déjà vu (or false recognition, or real anachronism) determines collective behaviors, lifestyles, and emotional propensities. To illustrate these behaviors, lifestyles, and propensities in a synthetic (yet not elusive) manner, it is opportune again to turn to the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*. We know already that the déjà vu subjects us to a *pseudo*-past, the fictitious "back then" that the present seems compelled zealously to reproduce. But every relationship with the past, even when it is utterly illusory, requires the development of a certain *historiographical talent*. Obviously what is in question here is not a scientific methodology, but an undertone of common sense, the nonpremeditated inclination to take care of what has been. The question that makes us again turn to Nietzsche's text is more or less the following: What kind of "historiography" appertains to the false past set up by déjà vu? What type of historical narration establishes itself at the "end of history"?

Nietzsche discerned three possible approaches to the cadaster of *res gestae*. He termed monumental that history (read: historiography) which strives to present models worthy of emulation: "a collection of 'effects in themselves' of events that will have an effect in every age."[13]

Critical history is that concerned with "passing judgment on and destroying the past": it is cultivated by those of us who, unable to bear the miserable present, attempt "to give ourselves *a posteriori*, as it were, a new past from which we would prefer to be descended, as opposed to that past from which we actually descended."[14]

Finally (though taking the middle place in Nietzsche's ordering), there is *antiquarian* history, which "preserves and venerates" the past, as it really was, in its totality, without missing out the slightest detail.[15] For the antiquarian historian, *everything* deserves to be kept alive in memory: the village fête, an incidental comment that just slipped out, the humble "almost vanishing traces" of history. Monumental historiography can degenerate into overblown rhetoric, and the critical approach into peevish rancor: however, since each of them maintains a certain link with activity and the unfolding of history, their overabundance is harmful to life to only a limited degree. Only the excess of antiquarian history causes irreparable damage. Its stunning suggestion that we ought to remember every particular raises the specter of hypermnesia, which Nietzsche discusses right at the beginning of this text: "Imagine the most extreme example, a human being who does not possess the power to forget."[16] This extreme case, at first brought up as a bogeyman, becomes a *routine* when antiquarian history has its way. It flourishes untroubled even "when history itself is lost"—even and *especially* then.

The pseudo-past, when we are being led on by the déjà vu, does not allow for filters or choices. Rather, it appears to be "preserving and venerating" everything, almost as if it were a vivid *hic et nunc.* Antiquarian historiography lovingly tends to the "once upon a time" evoked by false recognition. But, we should repeat, here "historiography" must not be taken to mean specialist knowledge, but rather a widespread and even banalized existential attitude. Correlating extremely closely to the post-historical mood, the antiquarian attitude is an indelible component of the forms of life characterized by the déjà vu as public pathology. But of what, exactly, does this attitude consist?

The "past" to be preserved and venerated (and this veneration's only requite is in mimesis) is nothing other than the present: or better, the present smuggled in place of something that already happened, through a real anachronism. Antiquarian historiography applies its own typical methods to actuality: everything that happens is treated as suggestive *evidence*, while it is still happening; the current moment is consumed by *nostalgia*. But the antiquarian inclination ought to have a more specific name for when it is concentrated on the present: *modernariat*. In its common usage, this term designates the—sentimental, aesthetic, commercial—interest in objects and artifacts belonging to the recent past (so recent, it skirts on today): the music of the 1960s, the political posters of the following decade, and then, continuing onward, the washing machine that just gave up the ghost, or last summer's fashionable hats. In the radical usage that we here propose, "modernariat" instead means the systematic development of an antiquarian sensibility with regard to the *hic et nunc* being lived at any given moment. In one sense, the modernariat is a symptom of the doubling of the present as an illusory "already-been";

but it also actively contributes to the ever-renewed realization of this double.

The modernariat is the historiographical genre that prevails when History always seems to be setting the pace; when, that is, it seems—as Bergson wrote of the déjà vu—"that the *future is closed*, that the situation is detached from everything although I am attached to it."[17]

The antiquarian history of the present gives rise to what Nietzsche called "a blind mania to collect."[18] The modernariat develops a sort of cult of whatever happens to exist *now*: it surveys it with "insatiable curiosity" and attributes it the stunning fascination and prestige of destiny. Walter Benjamin tried to put some of the prerogatives of the "antiquarian" approach to the service of "critical" history, or to make the antiquariat supremely critical: as such, he sang the praises of the collector (think of his "Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian"[19]) and his vocation of redeeming the "oppressed past" sabotaged by the victors of history, with special concern for the lowly, the hidden and the silenced. Benjamin's proposal is, today, being hideously caricatured by part of the modernariat, who favor a particular form of collecting: not to bring out in the present the plot of a thorny past which has been misunderstood (i.e., Benjamin's intention), but rather to give the present the stigmata of a sacred and unmodifiable past. Not satisfied with contemplating the "now" as if it were a "back then," the post-historical collector also nurtures a certain admiration for it, to the extent of concluding that "it's too late to do anything better."

The antiquarian history of the present, or modernariat, is wholly at one with the *society of the spectacle*. In turn, we could say that the society of the spectacle is the modernariat raised to the *n* th degree. The "blind mania to collect" of our time understands the present day as a sort of world's fair. An exhibition, that is, where the same individual attends both as an actor ("playing a role—for most people, many roles, thus playing them all superficially and badly") and as a spectator "wandering in search of pleasure." That is, they are their own spectators; or rather, though it is the same thing, they *collect their own life* while it is passing, rather than living it. Why is the present incessantly duplicated as the spectacle of the present? Why does it take on the aspect of a "world's fair"?

Such questions have become rhetorical, by now. The present is duplicated because of the déjà vu. When we feel that we are simultaneously both acting in and spectating on our lives, this is a case of false recognition. It is then, according to Bergson, that a person "is looking on at his own movements, thoughts and actions," such as to split him into two people, as if one were "an actor playing a part" for the other, spectating.[20] Far from only referring to the growing consumption of cultural commodities, the notion of the spectacle concerns, first and foremost, the post-historical inclination towards *watching oneself live*. To put it another way: the spectacle is the form that the

déjà vu takes, as soon as this becomes an exterior, public
form beyond one's own person. The society of the
spectacle offers people the "world's fair" of their own
capacity to do, to speak and to be—but reduced to
already-performed actions, already-spoken phrases, and
already-complete events.

X

This text is an edited excerpt from Paolo Virno's book
Déjà Vu and the End of History, translated by David Broder
and published by Verso in February 2015. The book was
first published in Italian as *Il Recordo Del Presente* by
Bollati Boringhieri in 1999.

Paolo Virno teaches philosophy at the University of Rome.
His recent books include *A Grammar of the Multitude*
and *Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation*.

1
A reference to Luigi Pirandello.
–Trans.

2
Henri Bergson, "Memory of the
Present and False Recognition,"
in *Key Writings* (London:
Continuum, 2002), 149.

3
Jean Baudrillard, *The Illusion of
the End* (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1994), 9.

4
Bergson, "Memory of the Present
and False Recognition," 155.

5
Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and
Utopia* (London: Routledge,
1936), 235–36.

6
Bergson, "The Possible and the
Real," in *Key Writings* (London:
Continuum, 2002), 230.

7
Bergson, "Memory of the Present
and False Recognition," 148.

8
Ibid., 150.

9
The future perfect verb tense is of
some significance in both
Bergson's essay on the déjà vu
and that concerning the possible.
In "Le Souvenir du présent et la
fausse reconnaissance" (*Revue P
hilosophique de la France et de
l'Etranger,* Dec. 1908: 561), he
writes: "As we witness an event
or participate in a conversation,
there suddenly arises the
conviction that we have already
seen what we are seeing, already
heard what we are hearing, and
already said what is being said …
in sum, we are reliving down to
the last detail an instant of our
own past life. The illusion is
sometimes so strong that in each
moment, as long as this illusion
lasts, we believe ourselves to be
at the point of predicting what is
about to happen: how could we
not know already, if we feel that
soon *we will know that we knew it*
?" (Italics added. This passage
does not appear in the existing
English translation in *Key
Writings* . –Trans.)

10
Augustine, *Confessions*, Book XI,
Chapter 20.

11
Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to
the Reading of Hegel* (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1980). In
the text I focus exclusively on the
long note in which he develops
the discussion from the twelfth of
his 1938–39 lectures at the Ecole
pratique des hautes études.

12
Baudrillard, *The Illusion of the
End* , 27, 73.

13
Ibid., 138.

14
Ibid., 138.

15
Ibid., 135.

16
Ibid., 127.

17
Bergson, "Memory of the Present
and False Recognition," 155.

18
Nietzsche Reader , 137.

19
Translation in *New German
Critique* 5 (1975): 27–58.

20
Bergson, "Memory of the Present
and False Recognition," 150.

Paul Feigelfeld

Media Archaeology Out of Nature: An Interview with Jussi Parikka

Over the past several years, Finnish media theorist Jussi Parikka's work has received widespread attention in the academic and art worlds alike. Besides contributing to the international foundation for what has been called "German Media Theory" with his work on media archaeology and his editing of Berlin-based media theorist Wolfgang Ernst, among others, Parikka has written on network politics, the dark sides of internet culture, and media ecology.

Together with Digital Contagions *and* Insect Media, *his most recent short book* The Anthrobscene *and the forthcoming* A Geology of Media *constellate a body of work that triangulates the world of planetary computation on many levels. From investigations of biological resonances in the design of media technologies—viruses, swarms, insects—to electronic waste, future fossils, and the significance of rare earth minerals, Parikka describes the complex layers that constitute media knowledge production under the technological condition of the anthropocene with academic rigor and artistic elegance. Currently, he works as professor of technological culture and aesthetics at Winchester School of Art.*

In the following conversation, Parikka and I address themes of insect media, the materiality of media culture, and other issues that relate to the conjunction of aesthetics, politics, and technology.

—Paul Feigelfeld

Paul Feigelfeld: You have constructed and analyzed multiple media archaeological layers over the last decade: digital contagions and viruses, technological waste, insect and animal analogies in media, and the geological, geopolitical, and climatic relevance of the present and future technological condition. Can you tell me a little bit about the relations and frictions that these layers have with each other?

Jussi Parikka: *Insect Media* is a book about animals, media theory, and how metaphors stem from material culture. The way in which insect-related notions such as swarms, distributed intelligence, hive minds, and computer graphics formations such as boids, the artificial life algorithm, and US military robotics have been foregrounded in digital culture discourse actually questions the material history of this manner of speaking about technology.[1] With this in mind, I became more interested in the scientific framing of insects in relation to the idea of alien intelligence. A similar theme was picked up in popular culture in the nineteenth century in the US, as well as in later instances, such as the thought of the pre-WWII avant-garde, or cybernetics in the 1950s, which

This diagram depicts the "waggle dance" of the honeybee. The waggle dance is a figure-eight-shaped movement the honeybee uses to indicate the direction and distance of flowers to other honeybees.

framed animals as communication systems. Let's return to this topic soon.

Regarding the cybernetic of the 1950s, my primary case study concerns the dancing bees for which Karl von Frisch became famous: the "waggle dance" is the specific embodied form of communication that von Frisch claimed to have discovered.[2] Gradually towards the end of the

twentieth century there has been a growing interest within the arts in nonhuman perception and embodiment. This can be seen in the notion that alien intelligence is irreducible to the intelligence contained in beings with two legs, arms, and eyes. Software and robotics experiments learned gradually that any system that is able to adjust and learn from its environment is more effective than systems which you try to directly design as intelligent. It's the

environment which is smart and teaches the artificial system. Such a realization stemmed from some streams of cybernetics, such as Herbert Simon's research in the 1960s, which aimed to show that an agent such as anant is only as intelligent as its environment.

These are some examples of insect media working across the material force of concepts and spanning technological and scientific practices. For over 150 years, many fields—from the sciences to the arts—have understood animals as part of modern media technological culture and have suggested ways in which animals and nature can be understood as conduits of communication.

My interest in viral culture—not merely viruses as objects, but contagion as a systematic feature of digital network environments—continued in another direction while studying this period that was so heavily influenced by cybernetics and information theory. I became interested in how the insectoid—swarms, distributed intelligence, the hive mind—finds its odd home in post-Fordist digital culture. It's like nineteenth-century Victorian culture all over again. Instead of insect motifs in women's hat fashion, digital rhetorics of insect intelligence ran through popular narratives.

I admit that such claims about insects and media culture *sound* metaphoric and all *cyberculturey,* but this is only before one starts reading and realizing that the arguments work against simplistic determinations and towards a media historical contextualization of how the biological and the technological are codetermining forces. It's sort of an extended materiality in which technology turns into its other: nature, animals, the organic.

From viruses to insects, early artificial life research piggybacked on the scientific field, which mapped the mathematical and systematic qualities of animal worlds. Unlike some American dreams of meat-meeting-tech, I, like Friedrich Kittler, have always been less interested in the hyperbolic dimensions of such cybermetaphors, and more in the historical links that reveal the project of modernity as an extension of the ways in which power works through technology and knowledge. In other words, I'm referring here to the historical contexts in which knowledge about animals and ecology gets turned into discursive strategies for technological constructs. The metaphoric carries a much wider scientific framework, but it does not explain it. Nor are the biological metaphors reducible to linguistic determinations. This sort of historical work should remind us not to naturalize technological development even if technologies are so embedded in the natural.

PF: And how do we arrive at the point where we step back to look at geologies as media-before-media?

JP: After viruses in *Digital Contagions,* and after insects,

The Hansen Writing Ball (this model dates from c. 1875) was an early version of the typewriter developed by Rasmus Malling-Hansen in 1865.

I wanted to extend the excavation of the animal and ecological energies of media culture to the non-organic.[3] This is where the new books, *The Anthrobscene* and *A Geology of Media*, fit in as a continuation of themes where media materiality extends outside media devices—for example, the minerals of computer technology that enable their existence as functioning technology in the first place.[4]

I remember a discussion I had with Steven Shaviro years ago, in which he actually suggested this to me before I realized how fitting it would be. He was talking about Whitehead's ontology in which feeling happens also in the non-organic sphere, but it was one of the sparks that led to thinking about the media history of the earth. It's the adaptation of the intelligence of non-organic life that determines so much of how accounts inspired by complexity theory have offered a "new materialism" of digital culture. But for me, it's an ecological, even environmental reasoning that drives this link. The resources that are searched for, identified, and located by technological means in order to drive our technological development consist of rare earth and other kinds of materials that are simultaneously part of the earth's durational history and part of the new media culture. They embody a media history of the earth, and also what will later become a sort of future fossil layer of technological waste. In other words, before and after media, we already have a significant amount of material things that are part and parcel of technological culture. Even dysfunctional technology merits its own place in the history of media—a history we are also writing in the future tense.

If you want one concrete object to illuminate this idea, think of the monstrous Cohen van Balen object *H/AlCuTaAu* (2014). Mined from existing technological objects, it's a sort of reverse alchemy that brands the "magic" of technological culture in high-tech relation to the earth. The gold, copper, aluminum, tantalum, and wheatstone that make up the structure are not merely traces of technology. They also represent the persistence of the elemental across various transformations.[5] Despite the merits of McLuhan's proposal, then, media are less about extensions of man and more about transformations of the elements. Already Robert Smithson spoke of focusing on the elemental earth matter instead of technology as extensions of Man.[6] In terms of the medium, this connection brings our topic close to land art—to Smithson and the contemporary variations of earthwork in the work of several artists. Among other people, I write a lot about Martin Howse's work, including his joint projects with Jonathan Kemp and Ryan Jordan. Similarly, thinking about artists from Trevor Paglen to Jamie Allen and David Gauthier, Katie Paterson, and of course Garnet Hertz has made it easier for me to find an angle to address the geology of media because their work already engages with such topics and offers an aesthetic framework for these ontological questions about media.

Women learn to type blindfolded at a secretarial course in the 1920s.

These questions are a natural extension of the material drive of our aesthetic and media theory. You know this better than I do: it is what the Anglosphere often identifies as "German media theory," in reference to Kittler and other thinkers who are interested in locating the materiality of cultural techniques in technological arrangements. But I want to insist that the materiality of media starts even before we talk about media: with the minerals, the energy, the affordances or affects that specific metallic arrangements enable for communication, transmission, conduction, projection, and so on. It is a

geopolitical as well as a material question, but one where the *geos* is irreducible to an object of human political intention.

Besides, it's good to avoid the obvious claims and conclusions. Media theory would become boring if it were merely about the digital or other preset determinations. There are too many "digital thought leaders" already. We need digital thought deserters, to poach an idea from Blixa Bargeld. In an interview, the *Einstürzende Neubauten* frontman voiced his preference for a different military term than "avant-garde" for his artistic activity: that of the deserter. He identifies not with the leader but rather with the partisan, "somebody in the woods who does something else and storms on the army at the moment they did not expect it."[7] Evacuate yourself from the obvious, by conceptual or historical means. Refuse prefabricated discussions, determinations into analogue or digital. Leave for the woods.

But don't mistake that for a Luddite gesture. Instead, I remember the interview you did with Erich Hörl, where he called for a "neo-cybernetic underground"—one that "does not let itself be dictated by the meaning of the ecologic and of technology, neither by governments, nor by industries."[8] It's a political call as much as an environmental-ecological one—a call that refers back to multiple (Guattarian) ecologies: not just the environment but the political, social, economic, psychic, social, and, indeed, media ecologies.

It's this sort of cascade of a thousand tiny ecologies that I want to trigger with my work on viruses, insects, and also the non-organic geology and geophysics of media.

PF: In the current age of big data and swarm intelligence, technology looks increasingly to nature and the animal kingdom for inspiration. But you argue that this has been the case since the nineteenth century. Can you expand a little on the history of this—at first—surprising connection?

JP: Let's think of it like this. When you start to look at how we talk about our technologies and also how they are designed, we are confronted with various expressions about nature—a fascination with nature, animals, and ecology as processes from which we can somehow learn. Despite promises of connection and economy or a culture of "human" sharing, networked media technologies are also described in terms that make us sound like insect colonies: distributed intelligence, swarms, hive mind, and so forth.

But as previously mentioned, this fascination with the insect was already part of a much earlier wave of enthusiasm for new technologies in the nineteenth century. This was the age of telegraphs, different audio-visual technologies, and a generalized expectation of the coming machine age built on the back of the first

wave of industrialization. Constant parallels between nature's perfection and the rationality of the machine already started to appear at the time. On the one hand, there was the idea that animals such as insects, with their multiple compound eyes, six legs, and "wireless" communication across wide distances, are like an alien life-form that mediates the world differently than earthbound creatures. You can find this notion in surprising places, such as entomology books. On the other hand, after Darwin but also continuing along with some earlier religious undertones, one finds the simultaneously occurring idea that nature is a perfection engine: a force that is always looking for an optimal solution to a problem. In architecture, this sort of relationship to the built environment persisted in the bridging of the "natural" and the "artificial."

David Cronenberg, The Fly (1986), film still.

Nature as a mathematician—a problem solver—is an idea with earlier roots. It is constantly referenced in descriptions of natural processes in scientific and popular science literature. For example, insect colonies are often portrayed as perfection machines, i.e., models that have a lot to teach us about optimization algorithms.

PF: But hasn't this turned out to be a misconception? Starting with early forays into the science of ecology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—think about people like Arthur Tansley—this idea of nature as self-regulating, harmonious, and always being able to find an equilibrium deeply ingrained itself into the systems theories of cybernetics up through *The Limits of Growth* (1972), while more recent studies have started to show that chaos, contingency, and change are much more significant and of course harder to simulate, predict, and deal with—on all levels. Doesn't this change the post-cybernetic approach to earth as media entirely?

JP: It seems to depend on scale. Looking at how insect colonies optimize their movements feeds into probabilistic problem solving; it does not carry the weight of the illusions of a harmonious planet in homeostasis. It's

on the level of technique that such "naturalizations" are still seen as useful ways of processing data.

But applying the idea of a self-regulating system to the level of the planet is of course another thing altogether, and much more difficult. As you point out, it has become clear that we are dealing with such massive levels of interconnected patterns that it sets quite a difficult task for simulation techniques. It's easier to simulate things when we know the agents and parameters involved. The more complex systems become, the more difficult it is to perceive and project the interactions, transactions, and intra-actions within. Computational power is one thing—useful both for financial institutions as well as artificial life research—but so is the careful work of selecting what we focus on in any simulation of a natural or economic process. Which variables are seen as important? What sort of agents are chosen as interacting, and in what ways? Based on what sort of data, collected where, and under what conditions do we mobilize projective calculations? What are the logistics and framing of the data according to which we want to perceive the planet as simulated?

Furthermore, some of the more naïve hypotheses of the self-regulating planet over the past century have always implicitly imagined the planet as something made for us: the underlying belief being that whatever we do to it, the planet will restore a suitable balance for us humans. If the planet is a self-regulating system, it does not necessarily mean that the time-scale is at all adjusted for the human species—Lynn Margulis already reminded us that "Gaia is a tough bitch" who works happily without any humans around.[9]

And the fantasy of homeostasis has not really disappeared from popular scientific discourse. It might have just shifted in order to be effective in other contexts. The use of feedback loops in health and wellness applications is such a big thing within the "quantified self" movement—a careful priming of the self that is however constitutive of a mix of environmental relations captured through an ever-increasing number of devices that enable us to perceive previously undiscovered patterns. Already in 1952, Ross Ashby introduced his Homeostat Machine in the Macy conferences on cybernetics, and today we are still in the midst of producing—and sometimes even fetishizing—cultural techniques of optimization.[10]

PF: Speaking of optimization, another recurring reference point is of course the brain—about which we still know very little. My favorite optimization procedure in AI and neural networks is called "Optimal Brain Damage," which works by strategically pruning connections in a network in order to reduce redundancies.

JP: The ideal of a perfectly optimized brain—read: connected emergent transmission network of any kind—is constantly fantasized through its abilities to

self-repair. The ideal brain can reroute around damaged areas. It learns. Flexibility and adaptation are the key words here, as shown in artificial life and AI research over the past few decades. From the original idea of intelligent machines, or representational AI, we have now moved to a focus on learning machines that are able to adapt to their environment and bootstrap the environment's cues as part of its intelligence.

On a slightly different but not unrelated level, Catherine Malabou has been able to clearly identify the relationship between the brain and contemporary capitalism.[11] Pasi Väliaho also picks up this connection in his recent book *Biopolitical Screens*, which highlights the military-scientific determinations of the neoliberal brain, which is presented as flexible even when prone to constant failure. Hence the importance of pedagogical drills—for example, the military recuperation programs that retrain traumatized soldiers.[12]

I became interested in this constant back-and-forth movement between the natural and the technological as a way of framing an alternative approach to technology. I started to look into how this theme of animality persists in a more ecological relation to technology. Ecology here does not necessarily mean "nature," but more accurately, the wider set of relations in which technology is understood as a historical and material conditioning of everyday life.

By examining insects, animals, and so on in this media archaeology of the animal and the technological, I was able to locate some very odd and inspiring insights into media, art, and technology. That brain you mention—we need to constantly remind ourselves that it's not a model of the necessarily *human* brain. The brain becomes a more general cybernetic model too. It's not merely the human that is modeled here. Design solutions are also picked up. Besides research into bees and their embodied forms of communication, think of, for example, British cybernetics and W. Grey Walter's cybernetic turtles, or scientific research with monkeys and dolphins in the US,[13] which was of interest to the US Navy.

It is not merely about insects of course; think, for example, of early robotics designed to be embodied and self-reflective of their surroundings. In a way this meant bootstrapping a sort of "tiny intelligence" as part of the robots' world-relations.

PF: How does the study of swarms of birds or fish, ant colonies, the analysis of ocean currents, or the creation of artificial life-forms help us create better models for collective agency and organization?

JP: In British cybernetics, William Grey Walter's work on a robotic tortoise in the 1950s was a good example of how to think, design, and plan in a non-anthropocentric way. In more ways than one, a lot of the early work of

contemporary society on smart agents that are responsive to their environments was set in post-WWII cybernetics; British and American scholars in cybernetics and information theory are the forefathers of the contemporary posthuman swarm-world.


A flock of starlings swarm together in migration.

Swarms are, of course, a key concept in terms of the insect media approach. The focus on swarms is a curious move, from nature documentaries about fish flocks to computer animation techniques that partially automate agent movements. One key feature of the recent enthusiasm for using "swarming" to describe emergent forms of organization is that it's no longer necessary to design a central intelligence; instead, one can build reflective, interactive, and developing systems that bootstrap "intelligence" into their behavior.

In other words, the beauty of a bird flock that seems to move with a mind of its own is the perfect visual conceptualization for an era that thinks in terms of emergent systems. But let's not be mistaken. This was already the case in the early twentieth century, when certain pioneers in entomology described the powerful, almost magical nature of this kind of organization. Some popular fiction writers at that time were amazed at how insect colonies acted like an organism composed of multiple distributed agents. William Morton Wheeler, for example, took a scientific approach to self-organizing systems and the "meta-intelligence" exhibited by the colony, which was often perceived like a machine. But that sort of a machine did not resemble the clunky steam and mechanical tools that characterized industrialization. Instead, Wheeler was already thinking of models that have become more prevalent in our so-called postindustrial age of intelligent machines—intelligent because they can adapt and learn. They are collective machines that synchronize according to the group and also the environment.

This also stands at the emergence of important traits of computer graphics and visual culture. "I would like to thank flocks, herds, and schools for existing: nature is the ultimate source of inspiration for computer graphics and animation,"[14] pronounced Craig Reynolds, a pioneer in artificial life and computer graphics. He said this in the mid-1980s to mark his "invention" of boids, these little figures of procedural graphics that moved from experiments in collective behavior to Hollywood films and the wider visual aesthetics of digital culture. In network science, the likes of Eric Bonabeau spoke of the design information gathered from social insects, pointing out that things like errors are not merely a thing to get rid of, but an instrumental part of the self-organization of a system that is finding and mapping the best ways to explore an environment.[15]

Robotic insects are the smallest flying robots in the world. The technology used to create them mimics the movements of the miniature muscles in a fly's wings.

This is the insect lesson: the difficulty of building intelligent systems is replaced by the idea that you can instead focus on building enough small subsystems so that, by interacting with each other, they are able to create intelligent systemic behavior on their own. Swarms then spread from technological discourse to describe many other things, and now they are indeed at the core of how we think about social behavior and even the economy; crowdsourcing is one such logic that relies on the existence of a network; the hive mind is a related conceptualization. Many other similar themes offer variations on how entomological themes penetrate our postindustrial capitalist society. We don't need to think of this as bio *mimesis*, as *imitating* nature; it's more of an embodied relation of gathering information about the relations that constitute specific informational and embodied patterns, and using those as design principles.[16]

PF: In both technology and society, there is a constant

back and forth between centralization and hierarchization on one hand, and distribution, decentralization, and nonhierarchization on the other. So how can metaphors of the animal world—especially when we think about networks—be used to think about connectivity in new ways?

JP: All of this gets really interesting, and really problematic, when we start talking about the "society of connectivity" through concepts related to nature. This is an old critique but still valid: using terms that are natural and naturalizing to describe complex social and economic relations in capitalist society is a perfectly tuned ideological operation. Critics of capitalism, such as Benjamin, made this critique in their own creative ways, by recognizing the back-and-forth movements of history and nature. This was part of the Frankfurt School agenda.

The same thing happens through historical retrojections: look, for example, at the number of stories that are written about the "first" selfie or ancient "social media" when some new archaeological discovery is made. It's perfect material for a pseudomedia archaeological search for the roots of phenomena that are media-specific and part of the postindustrial mode of capitalist operation. In terms of nature and animals, the connection between artificial life and capitalism is deeply embedded in much more than linguistic naturalization and metaphors. One can even say that this sort of discourse is the new version of Adam Smith's invisible hand. In this case, that means an interest in the semi-autonomous operations of software agents—for example, in financial trading. Since the 1980s, banks and other capitalist institutions have shown a growing interest in artificial life research, something I touched on in *Digital Contagions*.

But there is more than ideology at work here. The "swarm" is not merely a quirky metaphor adopted from biological discourse. Increasingly, swarms form our infrastructure, and are intelligent agents that act as proxies for our social actions, desires, and moods. The swarm is behind everything, from the banal to the cruel, from the networked smart house to the military-technology complex. The swarm is an infrastructural constitution of relations of sensing, data processing, and feedback structures, and it increasingly constitutes what we as so-called humans are able to perceive.

PF: How does all of this apply to the notion of the "cloud"? I am concerned that this metaphor of the ephemeral and celestial, puffy and angelic, conceals—in a rather smoke-and-mirrors way—the massive campaign of data centralization that it actually encompasses.

JP: I am tempted to say that it is as simple as this: the shop window is the cloud, and behind it is the brand—the massive, planetary-level political economy of infrastructural arrangements. It's in this sense that the Snowden leaks are as much about the wrongdoings of the

NSA and the GCHQ as they are about the software and hardware that allow data to flow and be intercepted. It's not merely about the specific techniques developed for interception, but about the whole arrangement in which data is stored, processed, and transmitted in ways that follow geopolitical preferences.

One can also realize this through such discussions as the "smart city," which is a similar operation and should be discussed in terms of the materiality of its infrastructure and the political economy that puts it into motion. Of course, this infrastructure might be partly cloud-determined; control structures for traffic, security, and shopping are processes not on the level of the street, but on the level the cloud. In practice, this can range from driverless cars to preemptive automated security decisions made based on projective risk calculations. But as suggested above, instead of thinking of this setup in terms of ideology, consider it in terms of a desire that is infrastructural and that channels our actions, perceptions, and potentials. This is the model that Deleuze and Guattari propose, and it works well in this context too; sites of storage, archives, and processing power that are connected to the sensors, interfaces, and so forth are where reality is being modulated. We should not get too stuck in a representational analysis of the terms, which of course might be interesting too. Instead, we should be able to track how desire is invested in infrastructure and material assemblages, and how we can conceptualize it accordingly.

PF: (When) will the engineer disappear and technology become evolutionary?

JP: The most interesting media theory work of the past few decades—such as Kittler's—has tried to think through this question in terms of self-writing. When machines are able to write, reproduce, and design themselves, they pick up on characteristics that are more than what is being engineered into them. In 1961, the British science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke suggested that "any *sufficiently* advanced *technology* is indistinguishable from *magic.*"[17] Sure, but perhaps we could now rephrase that to say that "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from nature," not merely because it is "inspired" by natural processes, but also because it disappears into its surroundings.[18]

It's not merely about the complexity. What I'm interested in is a different sort of a relation, one of material production. One can write an archaeology and a cartography of media technologies from the point of view of their materials—the gutta-percha used for insulation, the chemistry of visual media, the mineral basis of computationality. Lewis Mumford was among the first to hint at how to do that.[19] He spoke of the paleotechnical era, which was dependent entirely on the mining of coal, and the following modern technical eras that discovered modern and synthetic materials as well as new energy economies. These are the genealogical traits of a material history of media that begins with the material and its modes of organization rather than with the engineer.

Following Manuel De Landa's thought experiment, the future robot (media) historian won't be interested in the engineer, for example, but rather in the processes of organization, self-organization, and emergence of material components.[20] And, I would add, this robot historian will be interested in the affordances and logistical chains that ensure the availability of the material components that sustain what we think of as media and technology. The robot will most certainly have a more efficient system of dealing with electronic waste, too.

**PF:** So the engineer or designer becomes the material of media …

JP: Let's turn it upside down, indeed. The engineer does not breathe life into inert material. With their specific qualities and intensities, the materials demand a specific type of specialist or a specific method to be born, so that they might be catalyzed into the machines we call media. The material invents the engineer.

Media emerges with a relation to the earth and the planet, both through synchronization with natural processes perceived to be efficient—such as swarms—and through a systematic knowledge of what materials should be extracted to build such artificial machines; minerals, fossil fuels, and rare archaic elements dating back millions of years sustain the fact that we have high-tech media.

PF: There is something uncanny in the "otherness" of insects. We all know the saying that cockroaches and ants will long outlive us after whatever kind of apocalypse might come. How can we approach this posthuman discourse and the idea of non-anthropomorphic intelligence?

JP: This is the other pole of media materiality—not the earth from which media is composed, but what will remain after the technological. It is also the other end of screen materiality, as Sean Cubitt has long encouraged us to focus on: the hardware of the screens as a regime of aesthetics that falls under the theme of ecomedia. This is not an object of "ecoaesthetics" as a separate art work so much as it is the conditioning of the connection between the technological and its environmental baggage.

I write about fossils and their imagined futures in the forthcoming book, *A Geology of Media*, by addressing the idea of future landscapes of waste that will be the synthetic remainders of our scientific-technological culture. I move the focus from synthetic intelligence to synthetic rubbish. But in terms of the posthuman, the question is complex. In a recent interview, Rosi Braidotti nailed it when referring to Katherine N. Hayles.[21] Perhaps, she argues, we should be less concerned with the

Developed in the 1970s, this micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was an insect-sized micro Air Vehicle made to look like a dragonfly and is now on display at the CIA Museum in Langley, Virginia.

question of non-anthropomorphism than with non-anthropocentrism. Echoing Braidotti, some recent philosophy seems to have finally discovered non-anthropocentrism as a necessary perspective. But the insistence on abandoning anthropomorphism is rather difficult. We cannot just adapt a position of "nowhere"—of imagined object worlds—and a phenomenology or even an ontology of that sort of enterprise without having something to say about epistemology.

This marks a departure from some proponents of speculative realism. I am not that interested in getting involved in the current philosophical discourse that seems a bit removed from my concerns in materiality, art, technology, and historical conditions of issues that are quite pressing, not least the climate disaster. I am interested in the longer roots of the kind of non-anthropocentric thinking that still attaches to a wide range of determinations relevant to media history and media archaeology. For me, the philosophical question of nonhuman intelligence is one that we can address through media history: the various phases in which cultural techniques shift from humans to machines, and in which complex feedback loops and informational patterns redefine notions of intelligence. Alien intelligence also comes in many forms and has arrived many times already in the form of everything from bacteria to technological constructions.

PF: What, in your opinion, will be the (near) future of drones, (nano)bots, and cyborgs? Will all that remains be just posthuman wastelands of nanotechnological life-forms that fuse with the resilient insect populations of the future earth?

JP: As in the skies, so in the networks. That's as biblical as I can get. But more seriously, the multiplication of distributed agents connected to the military and corporations defines the way in which security and entertainment media worlds create a swarming near-future scenario, often envisioned either through the military possibilities of massively distributed robotics—from Grey Walter's robotic tortoise to the robotic "bee swarms"—or as the future of the service economy.

Swarms are really good at synchronizing, or as German media theorist Sebastian Vehlken has convincingly demonstrated, they are indeed synchronization machines.[22] They create collective behavior from simple elements, but they also have the ability to synchronize with their environment. This is where the flocks of anchovies in the waves and birds in the air become useful for understanding the smart environment. So much of what we put into our artificial distributed intelligence machines is predicated on knowledge about nature gathered for the past one hundred years or so. The natural is folded in as

part of the social and the technological, including military security applications.

Parts of Snowden's recent statements or "leaks" include mentions of the MonsterMind software swarm, which is designed to detect cyber attacks against the US as well as engage in preventive counterattacks. It's a struggle on the infrastructural and logistical level that characterizes these sort of situations where the target does not merely come in human form. This is one form of the swarm-service future, with the distributed "proxies" of surveillance, sensors, and military operations offered as software or robotics.

PF: Which means that technology's level of autonomy and autonomous nonhuman agency is rising. What if we thought about this not in terms of warfare, but in terms of ecological evolution? When swarms of networked nanobots migrate and flock to the Global South to mine rare earth minerals for themselves ...

JP: It's still a continuation of the security industries that are part and parcel of the protection of the resourcing, logistics, and accumulation of materials. The various military/defense equipment manufacturers are constantly looking for new markets, which also means that domestic security in many countries will see an increase in drones as the proxies of intelligent law enforcement. Drones are at the forefront of technological and legal battles over new forms of enforcing borders that are not merely national limits, but rather a variety of protected zones based on different security concerns, economic interests, and so on. They also create new cultural practices and subcultures such as those around DIY drone design.

Why would you have to invent apocalyptic future scenarios when all you have to do is write a descriptive account of the current moment? It was Sean Cubitt again who nailed it: the hostile cyborg-entity that's out to get us is not sent from the future in the form of a killer robot, but rather exists now as the distributed "intelligence" of corporations that feed on the natural resources of the planet and the living energies of humans. What are the institutional ties of drones—also in terms of their data relations? Where does the feed go, whose drones are they, and how is data gathered with sensors institutionalized and set into action?

The legacy of 1990s cyberculture should not be about idealizations of a new territory that is completely removed from nation-states. Remember the declaration of independence of cyberspace? Well, the supposed secession is more accurately a new layer of governance that cuts across the borders and layers of corporations and supranational bodies. It constitutes a reproduction and variation of forms of power, privilege, and security that works through producing knowledge, but also by means of brute force. Benjamin Bratton is the leading analyst of the new nomos that divides the earth and the seas, the clouds

and the underground. The new technologies of self-organization, such as swarms, drones, smart infrastructures, and so on, are employed in relation to the wider geopolitical agencies of the military-cryptological industries, and the border security of nation-states and privileged private spheres.

The novels on singularity that I find to be crucial markers of the emergence of the computational, digital culture of the 1980s and 1990s—from Vernor Vinge to Ray Kurzweil, from Erkki Kurenniemi to the critical accounts of Charles Stross—are embedded in the corporate work of Google. Kurzweil's day job in natural language processing is still geared toward his vision of 2029, when computers "close the gap" and reach humanoid capacities of "being funny, getting the joke, being sexy, being loving, understanding human emotion."[23] It's a perfect narrative for *Wired*, but it misses the point: it's not a given that humans get the joke, or are sexy, or loved. But this bootstrapping of the affective into the systematic search-engine-turned-computational-infrastructure of what used to be "cognitive capitalism" fuels this whole massive operation.

Florian Cramer is right to suggest that these supposedly technohumanist (corporate) fantasies are actually dystopian—including "Kurzweil's and Google's Singularity University, the Quantified Self movement, and sensor-controlled 'Smart Cities.'"[24] Hence the postdigital should not become a mourning ground for an apocalypse to come, but rather a more politically oriented historical analytics, programmatics, and ethics—an idea inspired by Braidotti. The nanotechnical and such are not to be projected as part of a future, but rather as an articulation of the technical media reality now, including everything from corporate cybogs to swarm-agency. Any conceptualizations of the "post" are not in this sense futuristic, but in the best case can produce a sense of the present as a temporal multiciplity worthy of our times. Again, I am echoing Braidotti in a feminist ventriloquist style.

X

Paul Feigelfeld is the academic coordinator of the Digital Cultures Research Lab at the Centre for Digital Cultures at Leuphana University Lüneburg. He studied Cultural Studies and Computer Science at Humboldt University in Berlin. Between 2004 and 2011, he worked for Friedrich Kittler and is one of the editors of Kittler's collected works. From 2010 to 2013, he was a teacher and researcher at Humboldt's Institute for Media Theories with Wolfgang Ernst. He is working on his PhD thesis, titled *The Great Loop Forward: Incompleteness and Media between China and the West*. His writing has appeared in *032c*, *Frieze*, *Texte zur Kunst*, *PIN-UP*, *Modern Weekly China*, and

other publications.

Jussi Parikka is Professor in Technological Culture & Aesthetics at the Winchester School of Art, University of Southampton. He is also Docent in Digital Culture Theory at the University of Turku, Finland, which is also his alma mater. Parikka has written on media archaeology, contemporary media arts, network culture, and cultural theory. His books include *Digital Contagions* (2007), *Insect Media* (2010), which won the Anne Friedberg award for Innovative Scholarship, *What is Media Archaeology?* (2012), and the forthcoming *A Geology of Media* (2015). He has edited such books as *The Spam Book* (2009, with Tony Sampson), *Media Archaeology* (2011, with Erkki Huhtamo), and a forthcoming book on Erkki Kurenniemi, the Finnish media artist pioneer (2015, with Joasia Krysa).

1
See Craig Reynolds, "Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model," *Computer Graphics* vol. 21, no. 4 (July 1987).

2
Karl von Frisch, *The Dancing Bees: An Account of the Life and Senses of the Honey Bee* , trans. Dora Ilse (London: Country Book Club, 1955).

3
Jussi Parikka, *Digital Contagions: A Media Archaeology of Computer Viruses* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007).

4
Jussi Parikka, *The Anthrobscene* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Jussi Parikka, *A Geology of Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

5
See the project page online http://www.cohenvanbalen.com/work/h-alcutaau .

6
Robert Smithson, "A Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects" (1968), in *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings* , ed. Jack Flam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 101.

7
Susanne Geuze, "I am not avant-garde; I am a deserter: an interview with Blixa Brgeld," *Volonté Générale* 4 (2014) http://www.volontegenerale.nl/interviews/i-am-not-avant-garde-i-am-a-deserter/ .

8
Erich Hörl and Paul Feigelfeld in conversation http://web.archive.org/web/20150605092202/https://www.60pages.com/from-the-anthropocene-to-the-neo-cybernetic-underground-a-conversation-with-erich-horl-2/ . *Originally published in Modern Weekly.*

9
Lynn Margulis in John Brockman, *The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). The conversation can be found online at http://edge.org/conversation/lynn-margulis1938-2011 .

10
See John Johnston, *The Allure of Machinic Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life, and the New AI* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 40–47.

11
Catherine Malabou, *What Should We Do With Our Brain?* , trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009).

12
Pasi *Väliaho, Biopolitical Screens: Image, Power, and the Neoliberal Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).*

13
See John Shiga, "Of Other Networks: Closed World and Green-World Networks in the Work of John C. Lilly," *Amodern* 2 (2013) http://amodern.net/article/of-other-networks/ .

14
Craig Reynolds, "Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model," *Computer Graphics* vol. 21, no. 4 (July 1987): 25-34.

15
Derrick Story, "Swarm Intelligence: An Interview with Eric Bonabeau," openp2p.com, Feb. 21, 2003 http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2003/02/21/bonabeau.html .

16
A point made also by John Johnston, *The Allure of Machinic Life* , 52.

17
The phrase is the third of the often-quoted "Clarke's Three Laws." This one is introduced in the later version of Clarke's story "Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of Imagination" (1973).

18
The science fiction author Karl Schroeder has also used the same phrasing in the context of the problematics of (detecting) alien intelligence. See Karl Schroeder, "The Deepening Paradox," November 2011 http://www.kschroeder.com/weblog/the-deepening-paradox .

19
Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1934) 2010).

20
Manuel Delanda, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (New York: Swerve, 1991).

21
Rosi Braidotti and Timotheus Vermeulen, "Borrowed Energy," *Frieze* 165 (September 2014) https://www.frieze.com/article/borrowed-energy .

22
Sebastian Vehlken, *Zootechnologien. Eine Mediengeschichte der Swarmforschung* (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2012).

23
Steven Levy, "How Ray Kurzweil Will Help Google Make the Ultimate AI Brain," *Wired*, April 25, 2013 http://www.wired.com/2013/04/kurzweil-google-ai/ . The Winchester School of Art is currently part of a consortium with University of California San Diego and Parsons School of Design where issues of artificial intelligence, synthetic intelligence, and remote sensing are addressed as part of our collective research work.

24
Florian Cramer, "What is Post-Digital?" *APRJA* 3.1. (2014) http://www.aprja.net/?p=1318 .

Philip Grant

Too Real an Unreality: Financial Markets as Occult

At the end of it all, the Queen defecates—gold bars. The queen in question is Her Britannic Majesty Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (and quite a few other places beside), but here she is presented more simply as the "Queen of England," just like the woman she has been conversing with through the short performance. That woman too is a Queen Elizabeth, or better still, *was*, since she died in 1603. As befits the dead, perhaps, she doesn't actually talk. Her image stares down at the second, living queen.

We are in Derry-Londonderry, a city with one and a half names in a place that has three: Northern Ireland, Ulster, the Five Counties, a place that is a country alongside the other three countries of the United Kingdom, but also a part of another country, Ireland; a place that is not British—unless you are a staunch Unionist—but is rather awkwardly joined to "Great" Britain by the copula "and"; at once united kingdom and asymmetrical duality. That the Queen in this script, the living queen, that is, the one represented by a local actress, Eleanor Methven, is the Queen of *England* is no accident.[1] This is not to say that in Northern Ireland all life, or even all politics, can be reduced to the Troubles and their aftermath, but the convulsions of the financial crisis and their aftermath cannot, perhaps, be read in this place without reference to its troubling constitutional situation—troubling, that is, especially for those who yearn for a world with clear lines of demarcation.

The script has been written by a local playwright, Jimmy McAleavey, and was commissioned by the Swedish artists Goldin+Senneby. The performance itself is exemplary of, and a product of, the kind of division of labor that makes the panegyrists of Global Capitalism drool: funding for the performance itself comes from the profits generated by an algorithmic trading program constructed and implemented by a computer scientist in the US known only as "Ybodon," on the basis of a design suggested by myself, an anthropologist and former equity fund manager.

The profits are modest, enough to pay the performer for a handful of performances. Still, that the algorithm made any money at all strikes me, the "expert" who proposed the underlying trading strategy, as near miraculous. What did I know about algorithmic trading? My limited expertise is in stock market investing based on so-called "fundamental research" into the business positions and financial strength of the companies whose shares we used to purchase on behalf of our clients. All the same, financial markets, despite the intimidating apparatus of "scientific" knowledge production deployed by experts purporting to explain them, are in some respects quite simple.

The artists' commission did not require us to develop a strategy that no one else had yet dreamt up, merely one that would preferably make some money while making an important point about contemporary finance: the way in which its workings are analogous to the old, long

The obverse of the Great Seal of Elizabeth I bears the Latin inscription: "Elizabetha—Dei—Gracia—Anglie—Francie—et-Hiber-nie-Regina-Fidei-Defensor." The sovereign is crowned and seated upon her throne, with her feet upon a cushion; she holds in her right hand the scepter, and in her left the orb surmounted by a cross.

Queen Elizabeth II sits for the official coronation portrait, 1953. Photo: Cecil Beaton/Camera Press.

discredited alchemy. For the Derry performance I proposed an algorithm based on Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP), involving buying stock in a number of large US banks at below their daily VWAP and selling them when they rise above it, making use therefore of the well-attested phenomenon of mean reversion. That is, in the absence of significant newsflow, shares tend to trade in a fairly regular pattern around an average price.

How the algorithm actually bought and sold the shares, I cannot really explain. The computer scientist informed me that it would be a simple "Python script," but a Python script is no more intelligible to me (nor to many others) than the pronouncements of the Pythoness at Delphi.[2]

Thematically speaking, Elizabeth II remonstrating with a portrait of her forebear Elizabeth I has little to do with algorithmic trading. In the script, however, the present queen complains that her money, printed by the Bank of England and stamped with her image, is worthless, because not real, merely a conjuring trick depending on the appearance of her likeness thereon. She harangues the old queen, complaining that her ancestor had made use of a "conjuror," the noted alchemist John Dee. References to Dee's coining of the expression "British Empire" are mixed in with references to the power of Elizabeth II's money in commanding soldiers' loyalty

during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The living queen berates the dead one, calling her a "money-grubbing bitch," in league with the alchemist to "turn freshly discovered earth into gold" by means of the Muscovy Company.[3] Yet for all her contempt for alchemy, troubled by the apparent unreality of her own money, she cries out: "Oh, Dee, Dee, I need your magic now!"

Dee's cosmic visions, at once mathematical, mystical, and sectarian, figured Elizabeth I as the righteous Protestant descendant of King Arthur, engaged in a struggle for world domination with malevolent "Hispano-Papists," a sectarian imaginary that continues to resonate in the Northern Ireland of the reign of Elizabeth II. And in the background lies the figure of August Nordenskiöld, invoked by Goldin+Senneby in their design for the VWAP assemblage: an eighteenth-century alchemist trying to make gold from base metal to fund the king of Sweden's wars with Russia, while surreptitiously hoping that the same transmutation will end "the tyranny of money" forever.

The suggestion, then, is that the opaque operations of an algorithm in financial markets cannot be separated either from the ebb and flow of British imperial power in Northern Ireland, or from wider questions of domination, inequality, and injustice, worldwide and historically; that all these questions are bound up with the troubling nature of money and value, those non-identical twins whose origin is obscure, whose very reality is often contested, and yet whose effects in the world are all too tangible.

Characterizations of contemporary finance as esoteric and occult abound. For the most part, these references are casual ones, but the sheer pervasiveness of these understandings, of the vocabulary of alchemy and sorcery, should give us pause and provoke us to ask why these metaphors have become sedimented in our language. In

Goldin+Senneby, Abstract Possible: An Investment Portrait, 2012. Work made in collaboration with Thea Westreich Art Advisory Services. Presented as a unique and strictly confidential report, the piece contains an evaluation of the artworks on offer in the exhibition Abstract Possible, its contents are only made available to the winner of the Bukowskis's auction.

its invocation of alchemy, the VWAP assemblage (of which this article is a belated part) provides not merely a critique of the entanglement of finance and imperial power, but also an entry point into a warren of alternatives, insofar as it insists that modern money and finance are magical after all, and that this magical quality is not something to shy away from or decry.

Finance as Occult

What is it about the activities of financiers or the dynamics of financial markets that incites this linguistic response? In general, when we talk of this occult imagery we are referring to a public imaginary, where finance is scrutinized from outside, but it is revealing that from time to time accounts of finance, or some particular aspect thereof, authored by financial market practitioners themselves, also resort to this vocabulary. Usually the emphasis in these cases is on how the complexity of markets is not amenable to a simple rational analysis and

explanation, however impressive the apparatus of economic thought built up around them.

A first example comes in the form of a "biography" of money by a London-based debt fund manager, Felix Martin. Critical of dominant approaches to money in economics, his work is haunted by the occult. "The great temptation," he writes, "has always been to think that coins and other currency, being tangible and durable, are money—on top of which the magical, incorporeal apparatus of credit and debt is constructed. The reality is exactly the opposite."[4]

Elsewhere he quotes Braudel to describe the exchange of bills at early modern European fairs as "a difficult cabala to understand," or describes Locke's argument in defense of silver as "at best a confusion and at worst a typical City smokescreen designed to conceal some no-good trickery."[5] The ancient Greek notion of value on which money was built was "an invisible substance that was both everywhere and nowhere"[6]; the vast network of special purpose vehicles created during the boom in the securitization of debt prior to the financial crisis, known as "shadow banking," is said to have discovered "a miraculous new means of creating money"[7]; Martin, not entirely convincingly, concludes that occult metaphor is "an euphemism. No transformation takes place—alchemy is as impossible in banking as in the natural sciences."[8]

A second example comes from a more notorious figure: billionaire speculator, investor, and political reformer George Soros argues that financial economics has failed to understand that it is part of the world it only purports to observe, and that as a result the picture of the "real world" it gives in fact distorts that reality. Investors in financial markets are not driven by "rational expectations," whatever the dominant theory might say, and markets, rather than being efficient, are characterized by "self-validating feedback loops" and cycles of boom and bust. Economics can have no predictive validity for such markets, and if it has no predictive validity, it cannot therefore be a science. He proposes to replace this "science" with what he calls "the alchemy of finance," a form of knowledge that jettisons the key assumptions of neoclassical economics with respect to finance, namely that investors are rational individuals with identical expectations about the future seeking to maximize profits, a situation that is supposed to lead to markets that are "efficient" and in equilibrium.[9]

This imagery of the magical and the occult is by no means as unequivocally negative as it may appear to common sense. The most striking example is Soros's attempt, in the context of a critique of the epistemology of economics, to recuperate the term "alchemy" for his own generation of knowledge about financial markets. More generally, "magic" in English is a readily accessible way of describing the positive, special, or beautiful characteristics of things, events, or processes that defy

explanation of their exceptional nature. Thus English speakers talk of a "magical" evening, ceremony, or trip, in such a way that the memory of this magical event is imbued with a sense of romance and mystery, even awe.

In the case of, say, Felix Martin's use of occult metaphors to gloss the process of maturity transformation in banking, there is something more admiring: if not quite as strong as "isn't this wonderful?," certainly, while asking us to remain vigilant, as positive as "the impressive thing about this is that it works, mostly, even though when you look carefully it doesn't really work at all."

This ambivalent quality of the occult, and especially of the uses of magic and alchemy, is something we ought to bear in mind: as we shall see, it resembles, and partakes in, the dual character of reality itself, which is simultaneously real and not so. This is why above I wrote that Martin's dismissal of alchemy as euphemistic was "not entirely convincing." Take maturity transformation, for example. Banks borrow money from their customers, in the form of the money we deposit in our accounts. They lend it to other customers. They (sometimes) pay interest to their depositors, and charge interest to their debtors. The latter is (or should be) higher than the former, whence a profit. The trouble is that most deposits have a short time horizon: we can deposit money one day and take it out the next, whereas loans are usually paid back over several years, or even decades in the case of mortgages. As long as the bank's income from slow maturing loans is greater than what it pays to depositors, there is no problem: maturity transformation appears to happen, as short-term liabilities (deposits) appear to be turned into long-term assets (loans). If the value of the bank's assets crashes, for example, as during the financial crisis, or if depositors lose confidence and rush to withdraw their funds, then the bank may become insolvent: maturity transformation appears to have been mere appearance all along.

Maturity transformation appears to happen, but really does not: this is a classically Western dualism, opening the way to a demystification of appearances through a demonstration of how reality *really* works. It cannot accept the possibility that both appearance and reality are reality, that maturity transformation does take place because its effects are felt in the world, crystallized in bank accounts, reflected in the loans received and the payments made by clients. What if we were to accept that this process does take place in the same way as the occult takes place, as a technique for bringing something about in the world, even if the explanations and justifications given for these effects are not supported by the investigations of what used to be called "natural philosophy"?

The etymology of a term shared by occult specialists and economists points us in this direction: the former "cast" spells and horoscopes, while the latter "forecast" market trends and key economic indicators. That to cast formerly

An illustration extracted from Aurora Consurgens, an illuminated manuscript from the fifteenth century that contains a medieval alchemical treatise.

meant "to reckon, calculate" is no accident. Both "casters" and forecasters deal with conditions which can never be understood in their entirety, futures whose course may be roughly predictable based on prior experience (whether this experience is analyzed statistically or not), but which invariably deliver, sooner or later, the unanticipated and disruptive, showing how knowledge as it has hitherto been configured is incomplete and inadequate.

Agency and Control

First of all, at the heart of the occult are questions of agency and control. The anthropologist Galina Lindquist worked, in the 1990s, with street traders from Moscow, at

a time when the glories of the ideology of "free markets" and the shock doctrines of neoliberalism were rendering the lives of millions of former Soviet citizens extremely precarious. For example, one woman struggled to survive as a trader while confronting the dual threats of organized crime and bribe-taking state police. This woman regularly visited a magus seeking assistance to help her modest business flourish amid these twin menaces. The magus' aim was, by using appropriate magical techniques, to uncover and rectify the trader's "negative karma," thereby opening her "money channel" and allowing her to turn a profit. Lindquist's interpretation, following Bourdieu, is that magic here was a form of action on a world where other means were insufficient, where trust between business partners or between entrepreneurs and state officials is lacking, where cold calculations of risk are nullified by a world that is simply too uncertain for them to be of any use: instead a hope that the future will be kind, or "ungrounded faith in good outcomes" is nourished by magic, part of local "logic of practice."[10]

Magic in this context is a *rational technique*, just as (to take a classic ethnographic example) magic spells had been rational horticultural techniques for the Trobriand Islanders: as techniques, magical practices are rule-based, supported by a wider epistemic apparatus, and oriented to the production of certain desirable and observable outcomes: "phenomenal attempts to secure control in situations of uncertainty."[11]

Cynicism aside, international capital markets at first sight seem to follow logics that are quite different from early neoliberal Russia. In such a setting, unlike in Moscow of the 1990s, relationships between market participants, clients, and regulators are supported by legal sanctions and the coercive authority of the state. In such circumstances, risk, generally understood as the probabilistic measurement of volatility and the threats it poses to earning an acceptable investment return (but also the opportunities it offers), becomes a key technique of evaluation and intervention.

Techniques of risk measurement, like magic spells, are rational techniques for dealing with and acting upon an unpredictable world. These are techniques whose efficacy is supported by science rather than superstition, and under normal circumstances, they appear to work and enable the generation of substantial profits for those who deploy them. Yet the expression "normal circumstances" is crucial here. These are rational techniques which, for all their undoubted mathematical sophistication, do from time to time fail.

The neatest example of this is the Black-Scholes-Merton theory of options pricing, which purported to calculate the prices of options as an objective economic reality, but which instead produced a convergence between its predicted prices and actual market prices in the 1970s and 1980s, before failing during the 1987 stock market crash, a moment of "counter-performativity," since when it continues to be studied and used, but alongside other models and calculations of price, none of them entirely satisfy.[12]

When we come to the credit derivatives at the heart of the 2007–9 crisis, the models involved were constructed by investment bank employees with advanced mathematical training, not by economists (like Scholes and Merton) who would go on to win the Nobel Prize. Importantly, these individuals themselves expressed skepticism with regard to the efficacy of a key family of models, the Gaussian copula, but the models continued to work—enabling profit generation, the continued employment of large numbers of well-remunerated employees, and coordination between different internal bank functions—until they too encountered conditions with counter-performative consequences.[13]

In circumstances they were not designed for, in conditions which they had failed to predict or adequately factor into their models, these techniques are of no more value than horticultural incantations or exorcisms of negative karma—of less value, no doubt—even if they are (but this is just like magic!) backed up by an impressive and internally coherent body of knowledge as to how and why they function. Far from being universally valid, scientific predictions contain in themselves a kind of performative magic effective only when certain conditions obtain. Sometimes, as in the case of options and the '87 crash, practitioners are more or less convinced of the correspondence between their models and market realities; sometimes, as in the case of credit derivatives, they are less convinced, and can see the role of their techniques in not merely describing, but constructing, the world they inhabit. In both cases, an uncertain future is brought under control, brought through rational techniques into the world of statistically analyzable risks, before irrupting spectacularly into this controlled world and challenging the efficacy of these techniques. Specialists of both occult practices and financial mathematics must either learn to cope with these challenges, or see the authority of their knowledge undermined.

Secrecy and Publicity

The second element of the shared logic of the occult and of finance involves secrecy and publicity. Anthropologists working on magic and witchcraft are frequently told by occult specialists that if they want to be fully informed on the subject, they ought to speak to someone else, someone who "really knows" all about it, but such a person is never forthcoming: the occult defers all attempts to render it transparent. Part of its effectiveness stems from this secrecy and mystery.

Goldin+Senneby, Money Will Be Like Dross: Alchemy Furnace of August Nordenskiöld (1754-1792), 2012. This is one of the few remaining artifacts from August Nordenskiöld's alchemical laboratory that sought to make the philosopher's stone open source and thereby end the "tyranny of money."

Magical techniques, wrote anthropologist Alfred Gell—comparing the effects of magic and art—benefit from "the power that technical processes have of casting a spell over us so that we see the real world in an enchanted form."[14] Art, he suggests, is a technical process, because its "beautiful" artifacts are, unlike a sunset, manufactured. Even Duchamp's famous urinal, he argues, by virtue of being in an exhibition with the artist's name attached, participates in this "essential alchemy of art, which is to make what is not out of what is, and to make what is out of what is not."[15] Immanent to all technical processes is a process of enchantment: as spectator of the process, or of its end result, an artifact or art object, I ask, with wonder, "How can that be done? How does it work?" I struggle to grasp "their coming-into-being as objects in the world," because the technical process transcends my understanding, and therefore I am forced to construe it as magical.[16] This process may fail, in which case it can provoke a devastating reaction, but when it works, artworks "dazzle" those who view them, convincing them that something occurs that is not purely technical.

Gell does not consider finance as such, but he does make a pointed remark about magic in contemporary industrial societies. We may think we are, in our quest for improvement and economic growth, comparing different technical means against one another, but behind this is a "magic standard," the myth of "costless production," one which ignores the off-balance-sheet costs, from mass unemployment to environmental degradation, of the endless search for perfect efficiency. In the two decades since he wrote, finance has increasingly become the technical means par excellence for achieving this magical perfect efficiency, its hegemony interrupted but not at all ended by the financial crisis. Moreover, finance is every bit

as opaque as the most "dazzling" work of art, opaque not only to nonspecialists, but even to those supposed to be overseeing and guiding it, the bank chief executives, shareholders, financial regulators, economists, and politicians who failed to foresee the eruption of the great crisis. Finance is obscure but equipped with powerful agentive force, a quintessential technology of enchantment.

It is true that, in some sense, financial market practitioners, prompted in part by regulation, often aim for transparency: of the kind provided by the publication of interest rates, or market indices, or long regulatory disclosures; markets are, the theory tells us, all about providing accurate and timely and freely available information: the closer we approach this ideal, the better or more efficiently markets function, and the more efficient they are, the better for all of us. Yet how many of us really understand how interest rates come to be? And even those of us who do understand (or think we do) can be blindsided by something like the manipulation of LIBOR by traders from major banks—and manipulation is a classically occult form of agency. Or take stock market indices: readily explicable as numbers which reflect the valuation of their component companies weighted according to the relative sizes of those companies, they "point" to the valuation the stock market places on those companies at any given time. These are commonly taken as *the markets* themselves, announced as such by fund managers in reports to clients and by newscasters to the general public on the evening news; they are taken to be indicators of the health of the economy, as the economy itself—and all the judgments and assumptions required to manufacture them are obscured by the elegance of a single number.

Financial markets depend on precisely this transparency, the immediacy of a number, behind which further information is less accessible. The fact that there is no shortage of expert explanation available for how these things work does not diminish their enchanting effect. Yet a mismatch between what Gell, talking of art, called the "magical agency" of the artwork (or the financial product), and the "human agency" of the spectator, persists: I may understand how a collateralized debt obligation works, but I couldn't make one at home.

And while Gell is enthusiastic about the "dazzle effect" of artworks on the spectator, when it comes to financial products this dazzling has a whole host of negative consequences too: from drawing into Wall Street bright young graduates whose talents might better be employed elsewhere, to making public, political, media, and even regulatory scrutiny of particular derivative products or specific financial firms difficult, if not impossible.

We can take Gell's reflections further: Is there something in the glare of the magical agency of our financial systems that is akin to what Michael Taussig described as the

"public secret," that which everyone knows but no one articulates? And which, even if articulated, is all the same not destroyed? Just as the Enlightenment destroyed magic, but rests on a magic of its own, so too finance, through its rationality—the force of its numbers, the logical brilliance of its algorithms—destroys earlier, nonrationalized understandings of how value is created, and yet finance's public—regulators, legislators, critics, the public, us—continues to be dazzled by it.[17] Finance exercises a tremendous agency, even subsequent to the financial crisis and numerous denunciations and demystifications of its operations.

David Graeber has written of money's emergence through a dialectic of visibility and invisibility. Most objects used for money, he argues, were also used as adornment for the body, and meant to be seen as a demonstration of their power in the present to onlookers: gold, silver, Kula shells (in the Trobriand Islands and their vicinity), Kwakiutl coppers (in the Pacific Northwest), Maori axes. It is no accident that "specie" derives from the Latin root meaning "to be seen" ("speculation" likewise). People adorned in striking ways, that is to say, meant to be seen, exercise power through this visual display: they summon us to treat them with respect because their adornments are evidence of them having been treated the same way in the past. Money, on the other hand, emerges from this visual display through abstraction: used as a medium of exchange, it exercises a kind of power that is oriented toward the future, because it represents the potential for future exchange. The future is invisible, and as a consequence money is endowed with a magical, mysterious, often dangerous potency.[18]

When it comes to modern paper money, Graeber notes, something of the specificity of earlier forms is lost: dollar bills are all (more or less) alike, anonymous, invisible at least as *specific* objects; *a fortiori* the electronic money, visible only as dull numbers on a screen, which accounts for the bulk of money today. Yet this money is often realized in highly visible, spectacular form: those possessing vast amounts of it buy mansions and yachts, even as millions, billions indeed, of others struggle to figure out how this money is created in the first place, or why it accrues so overwhelmingly to such a small number of people. Tellingly, ethnographic examples from other authors draw links between this dialectic of visibility and invisibility, the operations of capital in a postcolonial and neoliberal world, and the occult. Thus in South Africa in the 1990s, observed Jean and John Comaroff, there was a marked upsurge in accusations of witchcraft as certain members of the post-apartheid society acquired wealth quickly and spent it spectacularly, without it being clear how they were able to do so, even as most people continued to struggle to make do in conditions of great precariousness.[19]

Money also has this dazzling force at its heart; it is a phenomenon at once public and secret. Recall in *The*

Queen's Shilling the frustration of Elizabeth II at the unrealness of money, of the Bank of England notes whose value seemingly derived magically from the simple fact of her image appearing thereon. Money is visible: excreted as gold, scattered over the stage in the form of (fake) Bank of England notes. Yet it is also invisible, mysterious: produced through alchemy, through the opaque workings of financial markets, the obscure functioning of the royal digestive system.

Perhaps the VWAP performance's greatest sleight of hand is that, even as it explains that it is in part funded through algorithmic trading, this source of money is barely touched upon by the script of the performance; still less are its operations, the "how on earthness" of its generation of a surplus, explained. Money is made visible not as money, but in terms of what it can do. The brilliance of the design lies in this act of obscuring: the assemblage's ability to dazzle resides not just in the "surface" performance but in the hidden performance of the algorithm too. It is as if we are being incited to ask whether finance, however transparent it might be made through regulation and public scrutiny, is not inherently obscure.

Goldin+Senneby, Anti-VWAP, 2013. Work made in collaboration with Rob Drummond (playwright), Philip Grant (anthropologist & former equity fund manager), Donald MacKenzie (sociologist), Ybodon (computer scientist), Anna Heymowska (set designer), Johan Hjerpe (graphic designer), Mark Jeary (actor). Photo: Tom Nolan. In this performance the actor is employed a day at a time, for as long as the Momentum Trading Strategy algorithm provides sufficient revenue.

Of Reality and Unreality

Finally, in both capital markets and in the worlds of occult practice we are dealing with the play of the real and the imaginary, or the real and the unreal. The primary connotation of the real, or reality, here is that which is substantial, physical, tangible, enduring, as opposed to

that which merely seems to be the case, but is eventually revealed to be insubstantial, chimerical, intangible, liable to vanish into thin air. Part of the considerable traction stems from its strong resonance with common sense: what is real is good, what is not real is dangerous and deceptive. There is a strongly moral tone in this framing: what is real is wholesome, desirable; what is not real is a trick, fraudulent, to be unmasked or avoided.

Advocates of radical reform talk of aiding the "real economy," for instance by directing bank loans to the small businesses which supposedly constitute it, as opposed to the (by implication) unreal world of transnational high finance. By using "real" in this manner they are tapping into an ontology which is shared with the discipline of economics itself, which talks of the "real" economy as opposed to the "financial" economy, or "real" and "financial" assets, as well as "real" as opposed to "nominal" prices. Dig down beneath what appears to be the price, and you will find the *real* price, that is to say, adjusted for inflation. This opposition goes a long way back. With its origins in late medieval Scholastic theology and the competing ontologies of realism and nominalism, it was already centuries old when Adam Smith talked of real and nominal prices in the *Wealth of Nations*.

Yet even in both Romance and Germanic languages, where "real" and "reality" appear to be engrained, there was a time when speakers managed without these concepts. For most of the history of ancient Rome, until the late imperial period, Latin speakers had nothing equivalent to our "real"—reality was not part of their mental and cognitive apparatus. The term "real" is derived from the Latin *res*, i.e., thing, although the adjective *realis* was only coined in the fourth century. Its earliest uses in medieval Latin, whence it passed into Old French and thence into English, were to do with things and objects, as opposed to persons, and also with property, particularly of the immovable kind.

As for "reality" itself, it would be almost another millennium before that came into existence, in the form of the neologism *realitas* coined by the theologian Duns Scotus at the end of the thirteenth century. Even then the word didn't mean anything like our *reality*—it had to do with the formal, internal possibilities of a thing (*res*), and only gradually during the eighteenth century did its meaning shift towards factuality and actuality, culminating in the Kantian understanding of reality as what exists exterior to and not depending on the subject. A long shift, then, can be observed in the meanings of "real" and "reality," towards our present understanding of them as referring to what is actually, physically existing, as opposed to false or imaginary or illusionary: *things* that are objectively so. And if we once again return to Latin antiquity we find that *res*, thing, had as many intangible senses as tangible ones (cf. the *respublica*, the "public thing," the Republic—an intangible concept if ever there was one, although for all that none the less "real").

Reification (the turning of something into a *res*, a thing, but this formulation is tautological …), wrote anthropologist Marilyn Strathern, is a Euro-American habit: entities are turned into objects or things when they assume a given form, with given properties, and are therefore knowable as such. Common sense though this may seem, Strathern contrasts it with the Melanesian habit of generally conceiving of entities as always already relational, thereby perturbing and provincializing our sense that, whatever the differences between us, we can all agree that there is something "out there" that we may term "reality," knowable and manipulable as such.[20]

It is easy for rationally-minded moderns to write off alchemy, magic, and witchcraft as premodern superstitions. Setting aside the awkward persistence of occult practices across the world despite three centuries of rationalist criticism, these practices have an important effect in the world. As we have seen, they are rational techniques that enable those who use them to act in the world, to make an uncertain place more certain. As practices which depend for their efficacy at once on secrecy and publicity, visibility and invisibility, they are strikingly similar to the financial industry. And like finance, they are simultaneously real and unreal. And just as with the occult, it is only the persistence of the dominant Euro-American process of reification that makes us resistant to such a conclusion, that makes us insist on pointing a finger at the malevolent magicians of capital markets and shouting: what you did wasn't real—you tricked us!

For all that the value created by the development and trading of asset-backed securities or the general expansion of debt in the 2000s turned out to be illusory, it nonetheless existed. Large salaries and far larger bonuses were paid out on the back of it, and with those or with loans secured on them, houses bought, markets for various goods and services created or stimulated, and investments made. GDP grew, tax receipts rose, governments disbursed funds.

Recognizing that reality and unreality are not antonyms, but two possible states whose actualization depends on certain conditions obtaining or not obtaining, helps us in turn understand the resort to metaphors of alchemy, magic, and sorcery when talking of finance. These are not metaphors, but catachreses.

In rhetoric, catachresis stands problematically midway between literal and figurative speech. In English, table "legs" or clock "hands" or river "mouths" are all catachrestic. They are not "actually" legs, or hands, or mouths, but these words are used by extension from their primary meanings to describe phenomena for which we have no other word, and which are in some way analogous to legs, or hands, or mouths. These are not quite metaphors as in the lines "Now is the winter of our discontent / Made glorious summer by this sun of York."

Goldin+Senneby, Money Will Be like Dross, 2012. Work made in collaboration with Pamela Carter (playwright), Malin Nilsson (magician), Eva Rexed, Joel Spira, and Jakob Tamm (actors). Performance view: Drottningholm Palace Theatre, Stockholm. Photo: Lina Bjerneld.

We can talk of discontent or York without describing them as winter and summer. It is not so with clock hands or chair legs: we have no other words to describe these. It is hardly surprising that Derrida's reflections on catachresis are one of the founding texts of deconstruction, or that Spivak has extended catachresis in a postcolonial direction in arguing that the key concepts of Enlightenment political philosophy ("citizenship," "rights") may do service in postcolonial contexts by describing new political realities offering radically different possibilities, nonetheless connected to their Euro-American namesakes. Catachreses are troubling, disruptive, both concepts and metaphors, both literal and figurative, churlishly (their Latin name is *abusio*) stirring up and muddying the waters of conceptual clarity, driving home the point that the world's neat oppositions are rarely stable.

We have no better words to describe the (un)reality that is contemporary finance, so we use these catachreses instead. We know that financiers are not alchemists or magicians, but what do they do, really? How does finance create value? Why does that value, which has so many "real world" consequences, sometimes turn out to be so prone to disappearing? If finance is not the "real economy," why does it have such an impact on the real lives of real people? We know that finance isn't alchemy, but at the same time we do not know what it is, what else to call it. Alchemy, or other occult terms, are open to the charge that they misdescribe reality, that their conclusions are not real. Financiers apply sophisticated statistical techniques and clear logic, yet are open to the same charge. Both alchemy and finance are in other ways entirely real, as we have seen. "Finance is alchemy, which is not real, yet both finance and alchemy are real," would be a succinct way of stating the problem.

It might be objected that after long study and patient enquiry the workings of the contemporary financial system may be grasped by sound reasoning and demystified after all. Yet despite study after study, from the ponderously erudite to the racy bestseller, purportedly showing us how this all works, or why it doesn't, something of the mystery remains. Perhaps the profusion of books and articles suggests there is something ineffable about finance; or perhaps this appearance of ineffability is evidence that there is a technology of enchantment at work, so that even when we think we know how things work, their dazzling effect is not dimmed. It is one thing to understand a financial system, another to contemplate making one at home.

That it should exist at all, and on such a vast scale, trillions of dollars that are mere numbers on screens (when they are visible at all); that it should have collapsed, and yet six years on that it should still exist: of course we need our catachreses to describe this, and it is the value of dealing with this monstrous phenomenon in terms of alchemy and magic that makes the odd assemblage that is VWAP so compelling.

Assembling an Occult Economics

Modern finance and modern magic and witchcraft are not merely two parallel words governed by similar logics; they are intertwined. Far from being some bizarre throwback to an irrational, premodern age, magic and sorcery—and accusations of the practice thereof, often amounting to a kind of paranoia—abound today in precisely those situations where the operations of finance capital have created the greatest inequalities and the starkest contrasts between the expectations of the many and the realizations of the few.

We remain severely limited in our ability to influence unreal reality, because we have failed to understand that it is both real and unreal at the same time, and instead demand that it always be real only. We seek to delegitimize financiers by calling them out as magicians, but we fail to realize that their magic is real. More importantly, we fail to realize that we can challenge them on their own terrain, that they have no monopoly of the technology of enchantment.

What then, if we were to learn from the gold-defecating queen screaming in frustration at the unreality of her money, pleading with her forebear and namesake to lend her her long-dead alchemist? Or better still, to become ourselves alchemists and occult operators?

We could begin with a more concerted attempt than any hitherto to generate new knowledge forms: an "economics" that would be plural, allying artists, anthropologists, sociologists, activists, feminists, environmentalists, financial practitioners, and, yes,

economists, remembering both that many of us wear more than one of these hats. This catachrestic economics would be mindful of the need for a political and ethical framing of its occult techniques in favor of equality, social justice, and care for strangers: not for us either sectarian world empires or the totalizing ideology of capitalist realism. It would analyze algorithms and models, their conditions of production and performativity, but it would also perform other realities, conjure up other financial systems, even as it pointed through its performances to the modalities of operation of our existing financial system. It would be equally at ease with spreadsheets, ethnographic inquiries, and theater, refusing to privilege one above the others as constituting what is really real. It would mobilize all these and other rational, magical techniques, in the knowledge that they create the world as much as they control it. This "economics" exists already, if only in shreds and patches. Our task is to assemble it.

X

Philip Grant is Research Fellow in the Social Studies of Finance at the University of Edinburgh. He works on the European Research Council project 291733, "Evaluation Practices in Financial Markets," a sociological exploration of investment management. He has a Ph.D. in Socio-cultural Anthropology from UC Irvine, where he worked with Iranian women's activists. He is also a translator of Persian prose and poetry into English.

1
The immediate stage is the city's Centre for Contemporary Art, nestled against the seventeenth-century walls. The broader stage is its program of events for its year as European City of Culture.

2
I am sure I could learn, but for the time being its operations remain mysterious, opaque, obscure: part science, part magic.

3
The Muscovy or Russia Company was actually founded in the reign of Elizabeth's half-sister Mary I, in 1555. Its royal charter gave it the monopoly of Anglo-Russian trade. As a joint-stock company whose capital was open ended (i.e., the company continued in being after each trading voyage), it was a model for other Elizabethan and Jacobean trading companies such as the Merchant Adventurers, the Levant Company, and the East India Company. See T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956).

4
Felix Martin, *Money: The Unauthorised Biography* (London: Bodley Head, 2013), 29.

5
Ibid., 67 and 126.

6
Ibid., 130.

7
Ibid., 246.

8
Ibid., 289.

9
George Soros, *The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market* (New York: Wiley, 1999).

10
Galina Lindquist, "In Search Of The Magical Flow: Magic And Market In Contemporary Russia," *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 29 (2000): 317.

11
Ibid., 316.

12
This story is told in Donald MacKenzie's "The Big, Bad Wolf and the Rational Market: Portfolio Insurance, the 1987 Crash and the Performativity of Economics," *Economy and Society* 33 (2004): 303–334.

13
Donald MacKenzie and Taylor Spears, "'A device for being able to book P&L': the Organizational Embedding of the Gaussian Copula," *Social Studies of Science* (2014): 418–440.

14
Alfred Gell, "The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology," in *Anthropology, Art, and Aesthetics*, eds. J. Coote and A. Shelton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 44.

15
Ibid., 54. This is not to say that Gell's theory can be applied to all forms of art as they developed in the twentieth century. His definition of art embraces Trobriand canoe carvings (which were not, to Trobrianders, "art," since this was not a meaningful category for them) and art in the modern Euro-American sense. It might not cover all of those art practices where artists attempt to minimize technical intervention, however. Gell suggests that the reason for public contempt for some forms of contemporary art is this art's failure to present itself as the consequence of occult technical prowess.

16
Ibid., 49.

17
By the magic of Enlightenment I refer both to the negative dialectical relationship between reason and myth, as Horkheimer and Adorno long ago described it, and more generally to the very idea of "Enlightenment" as a rallying cry. The metaphor of Enlightenment, the light of reason shining in the face of darkness, superstition, atavism, and fanaticism, is itself a powerful technique. Its use allows the speaker to position him or herself as the defender of rational and civilized values, as the standard-bearer of progress, morally and politically in the right, while foreclosing any rational inquiry into the coherence of these claims. In this a-historical version, "Enlightenment" has nothing messy or contingent about it, nor does it cast a shadow.

18
David Graeber, "Beads and Money: Notes Towards a Theory of Wealth and Power," *American Ethnologist* 23 (1996): 4–24.

19
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony," *American Ethnologist 26* (1999): 279–303.

20
Marilyn Strathern, *Property, Substance, & Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things* (London: Athlone Press, 1999).

Jon Rich

The Communal Rift: The State Must be Defended

The perpetrators of the crime against the French weekly *Charlie Hebdo* were French citizens. The fact that they are not foreigners is an irony and does not explain much, as many mistakenly perceived, about the factors leading up to the current (historical) moment. The fact that Western cultures see this as a paradoxical trait of modern societies points to a deeper flaw in the structure of modern societies themselves.

For the criminals at hand to qualify as French, one expects all apparatuses of the state and society to treat such a heinous act as an isolated, individual case—or at worst, an action connected to a narrow, exceptional local community concerned with local events. This expectation also requires that the perpetrators not presume they are struggling for a cause that matters to millions of people beyond their national borders. Nor does it exempt the French public, and more generally the European public, from understanding what happened as a matter that doesn't extend beyond their own borders. Otherwise, what would it mean to attach such an identity or belonging to a homeland?

A modern state presumes equal loyalty from all its citizens and an equal submission to its laws. Any violation of the law is to be treated as an isolated, individual case. To this day, modern (Western) societies have failed to integrate all inhabitants as citizens. It is most likely that touristic postmodern philosophies, which for years have celebrated this civic fragmentation in the cosmopolis as a huge achievement, have, due to their intellectual laziness, paved the way for the destruction we witness today. Every metropolitan center is comprised of religious, sectarian, and ethnic cantons. In our intellectual downtime, we muse on the idea of a Koreatown in New York and a Chinatown in London as ideal backdrops for souvenir photos. Yet we forget to concern ourselves with the following question: Why haven't modern cities been able to break down groups into scattered, law-abiding individuals?

Some of modernity's hallmark beliefs, such as citizenry and individuality, have perhaps continued to be subordinate to historical formations of identity—as long as the borders between states remain solid and hard to penetrate.

Numerous technologies have emerged since the early waves of immigration. Meanwhile, nation-states seem to prefer to look away from social harmony as their foundation. Let us not forget how nation-states in Europe have historically created clear rules and fortified borders to ensure their social, religious, and ethnic harmony. The European Union, since its inception, has been in essence an attempt to reorganize prehistoric divisions into a new European whole. Today, Europeans are Roman, Germanic, Gaul, Catalonian, Celtic, and Slavic. They are also Turk, Kurd, Arab, Tatar, Chinese, and Japanese.

Have we tried to mend the ensuing rupture that divides

Despite press images suggesting a crowd behind them, the international heads of state who joined the January 11 Charlie Hebdo march in Paris were isolated from the crowd for security purposes, as revealed in this rare birds'-eye view. Journalists and activists have pointed to freedom of speech abuses perpetuated by the countries of several officials who joined the march.

modern societies and threatens to destroy them? I don't think so. The *Charlie Hebdo* attack is a harbinger of things to come. And not for the amount of blood spilled. On the same day that the Kouachi brothers killed thirteen people in Paris, an explosion in the Yemeni capital of Sanaa ravaged more than one hundred lives between the dead and the injured. The Yemenis die as if they never lived. This is true mainly because the French blood flowed in a place full of light, in the City of Light, while the Yemeni blood flowed in darkness. By pointing out this contrast, it is not my intention to pay respect to the Yemeni blood at the expense of the French, nor is it an attempt at Maoist equalization. The irony is in the fact that the murder in Paris did not only befall a few individuals—among them some celebrity cartoonists. Rather, the effects are much more widespread: what happened in Paris could destroy the entire world. It is a warning that the entire ship is about to sink. The Yemeni casualties are larger in number than the French. Yet the Yemenis were floundering in the midst of a turbulent ocean while the French ship was supposed to be safe and stable, even capable of rescuing the Yemenis themselves.

The *Charlie Hebdo* massacre is far more horrific than that of 9/11. Once again, this is not a game of comparing numbers. It also has little to do with whether it took place on the "brighter" side of the world. Thirteen years ago, there were forces within Muslim and Arab societies that were connected with modernity and that amounted to sufficient number and influence to make a considerable and lasting contribution to their societies. Back then, it would have been possible for the Western intelligentsia to lend its full support to these nascent movements in order to effect an outcome worthy of modernity. Today in the

Arab and Muslim world, however, this modernist machine is completely broken. There is no doubt that the Western intelligentsia will have to take on the thankless task of rescuing the sinking ship entirely on its own. That is, if such a rescue is at all possible. The Western intelligentsia should at least try to urgently save the countries where the rule of law and the need to uphold the ideals of the modern state still carry some weight. This intelligentsia should also speak loudly against all plans to combat terrorism carried out by Western countries in the region today. It makes little sense to anyone who possesses a modernist mindset that a plan to confront ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates should involve arming and supporting the main tribes in Syria and Iraq—or that the Shiite Militia is trustworthy enough to be pitted against the "ominous" Sunni forces. General Petraeus's failed plans in Iraq have only succeeded in transferring the aggression from one front to another, since his main strategy was to aid structures and networks that, by all standards, are far more primitive than the terrorist organizations they were supposed to eradicate. I say this because I want to try to move the needle in another direction and to not cease confronting evil entirely. General Petraeus might have succeeded, militarily speaking, in eliminating a clear, immediate danger. But he most certainly couldn't prevent the resurgence in a nearby region of a far deadlier evil.

Sadly, there is no magical recipe to follow to lead us out of the darkness that is about to engulf us. There is no hope of any authentic, meaningful public condemnation of the Paris tragedy coming out of the Middle East. Therefore, we cannot sit idly by and watch modern society in Western democracies drift into the tunnel of mob thinking. On her Fox program *Justice*, Judge Jeanine Pirro instigated viewers to "murder them all." Anger is understood, but so is idiocy. The question that Judge Pirro failed to ask was: Who are those people to whom the invitation to take revenge is being extended? Is Judge Pirro completely certain that American whites, Christians, Protestants, or those in the Bible Belt all form an ISIS-like angry mob? An amorphous group that possesses no response to difference other than mirroring what they perceive ISIS does to people who are different than them, with indiscriminate killing being the only viable punishment? In reality, even ISIS tries to switch its punishments around: sometimes severing a hand is appropriate, and at other times flogging sends the right message.

One wonders about the depth of the abyss that Western public opinion sinks into sometimes.

Alain Touraine reaches one important conclusion in his latest book *The End of Societies*—which sadly has not been translated into English yet—namely, that Western countries still exclusively possess the power and authority to prevent dying societies from self-extinction. The modern state is still capable of shifting societal violence from direct physical contact towards the domain of the verbal with full punishment, and within the limits of the

law. The state also has the power, through institutional and official bureaucracy, to create clear-cut structures of equality by reducing the notion of "the public" to clerical consistency. Yet today, one state is under a real threat of renegotiating such a promise and authority. In Canada, thousands of immigrants had their citizenship revoked on the grounds of alleged violations of immigration law. And in the US, approximately five hundred US citizens with direct ties to terrorist organizations are denied rights and protections under any law, even in cases where their own lives are threatened. In post- *Charlie Hebdo* France, strict rules have been instated to curb speech, regarding any verbal or written justification of violence as a punishable crime. This abandonment, limited as it is, of the basic rule of equality among citizens foreshadows a larger threat to the integrity of the state. It comes at a time when the state sees a free and orderly society as a threat to its own existence, treats core members of its citizenry as suspects, invades their private thoughts, and demands a public declaration of their innocence. When the state forces individuals to reveal private thoughts, it violates their identity as citizens; having an external persona that is coherent, consistent, and compliant on the one hand, and an interior persona that is protected and free on the other, is one of the defining attributes of what it means to be a citizen. Isn't this duality of internal and external life precisely what ISIS is fighting to destroy in the areas under its control? Isn't ISIS, at the end of the day, a triumph of the mob against the notion of the state, irrespective of the identity of this mob, its embrace of modernity, and its ability to accept and tolerate the other?

Total equality is yet to be attained by the modern state. There have always been areas in which safety and security prevail more than elsewhere. These are neighborhoods that big cities are unenthusiastic about bringing into the fold of care and control, as Jean Carbonnier has observed.[1] The issues around the North African presence in France, the Turkish presence in Germany, and the African-American presence in the US are not new. In spite of that, the state has always been vigilant in upholding, at least in writing, a strict code of no overt discrimination based on color, gender, religion, or ethnicity. And yet, the state finds itself today deferring crises and limiting their damage by willingly compromising its core values when confronted with potential threats from its citizens. Despite all of the aforementioned signs, the state must be defended and protected because its weakness and eventual fragility, or its domination by a deadly mob, will only lead to more hot and cold civil wars in states that have miscalculated the means of transcending utter brutality under the terms of their admittance into the modern era and into the force of history.

X

Jon Rich was born in Amman in 1965. He teaches Arabic and sociology in Lisbon, where he has lived since 1990.

1
See Jean Carbonnier, *Flexible droit: pour une sociologie du droit sans rigueur* (Paris: Broché, 2001).

Ewa Majewska

The Common in the Time of Creative Reproductions: On Gerald Raunig's Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity

What relationship is there between the work of art and communication? None at all. A work of art is not an instrument of communication. A work of art has nothing to do with communication. A work of art does not contain the least bit of information. In contrast, there is a fundamental affinity between a work of art and an act of resistance.

—Gilles Deleuze

After *Art and Revolution*, *A Thousand Machines*, and texts and interventions in defense of public education, heterotopias, and the right to movement, of which some have been published in the journal *Transversal*, the book *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity* appears as a summary of Gerald Raunig's long-standing research into radical theories and practices of cultural resistance. Now Raunig's two main inspirations, critical theory and French poststructuralism—in particular Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari—are combined with post-operaist immanentism. The book includes a short afterword by Antonio Negri emphasizing the importance of this "countermelody" for building resistance and solidarity in the common. As I will argue, in this combination, all sides gain: operaismo obtains a concept of the common enriched by some aspects of the more traditional notion of the public; critical theory gains a way of overcoming the impasse of nostalgia; and poststructuralism benefits from a more materialist notion of critique and resistance, a vision of practice allowing the new heterotopias to come.

Gerald Raunig's theorizing harkens back to the early days of the Frankfurt School, and not just in the way it takes the classical theme of the culture industry and reappropriates it for a Deleuzian theory of contemporary cognitive capitalism based on creative and affective labor. Indeed, its most striking similarity with the project of Adorno and Horkheimer lies in its capacity for theorizing contemporary social conflicts in a way that combines theories and practices—and often micropractices—in order to create inspiring theoretical machines that resemble Deleuze and Guattari's war machines.

This aspect of the German philosophical tradition—the effort and capacity to be modern in the sense of building a critical, self-conscious discourse embracing the issues at the core of contemporary political conflicts, such as the conflict over the current transformation of public education—is paradoxically made possible by developing notions that derive from a very different, antitranscendental and materialist tradition. The questions formulated by Adorno and Horkheimer in their analysis of the culture industry resonate with Raunig's critical observations concerning the recent neoliberal transformations of the university, in which quantitative measurements emphasizing immediate effectiveness replace qualitative criteria and the long perspective of the early days of the university. The so-called Bologna Process, which aims to unify university programs and measures of evaluation across EU countries, results in a

This Free/Slow University of Warsaw graphic, designed by Krzysztof Bielecki, was used during the Art Field as Social Factory Conference in November 2014.

highly technical approach to knowledge production and reduces the student-professor exchange to brief moments of grading rather than discussion, which prevailed before. The public mission of universities is replaced by the modus operandi of the factory, in which quickly measurable products and their "parameterization" replace debate and procesual approaches. The resistance to these processes—such as the Occupy movement, but also other protests, for example in London, Berkeley, and Krakow—not only try to halt the transformation of universities into corporations; they also offer lines of flight out of the profit-oriented, neoliberal main current.[1] The Free/Slow University of Warsaw (WUW), a project organized by Kuba Szreder and other academics and curators, is an alternative to the instrumental approaches that dominate academia today. WUW tries to combine knowledge from the arts and sciences to allow workers from both fields to understand contemporary mechanisms of commodification. Analyzing contemporary modes of production, it calls upon practices of solidarity and resistance.[2] Gerald Raunig was one of the first guests at the seminars offered by WUW. Later on, theorists, artists, and activists such as Martha Rosler, Luc Boltanski, Patricia Reed, and many others joined us in Warsaw to produce what I would call "counter-knowledges," referring to the "counterpublics" suggested by Nancy Fraser.[3]

With his machinistic apparatus, however, Raunig remains far from the sentimental approaches of some liberal

critiques of the recent transformations in the university and culture, in which the humanities should be preserved as some form of "art for art's sake," albeit deprived of any political signification.[4] In Raunig's analysis the university, and the humanities in particular, are a political matter, not because of their supposedly "disinterested beauty," alienated from any social and political context, but precisely because they constituted a zone of critique, resistant to marketization and financialization, and they therefore enrich the cultural experience of contemporary individuals. His sharp sense of observation is at its best when formulating the twenty-eight tendencies of changing university, of which the twenty-sixth is as follows:

> The university is becoming an actor in the intertwined strategies of the real estate market and infrastructure policy: the upgrading of the city districts, gentrification and the transformations of formerly industrial or working-class neighborhoods into zones occupied by creative management.[5]

In Raunig's thinking, the "merging of discipline society and control society,"[6] the combination of restrain and free circulation, should be regarded not as a linear process—as it was in Deleuze's groundbreaking essay "Postscript on the Societies of Control"—but in terms of a simultaneous striating of space, the constant forming and deforming of modules. In this analysis, a critique of today's academy is combined with an analysis of the "edu-factory" project and other initiatives that resist the neoliberal reshaping of the university. In his review of Raunig's book, Krystian Szadkowski rightly points to the first analysis of the university as a factory, which was proposed in 1909. He also observes that Raunig's narrative is perhaps less focused than such an analysis demands.[7] Yet, in defense of Raunig, I would like to argue that a centralized, linear narrative would lose its connection to the events depicted, which, both on the side of the new management of the universities and on the level of the lived experiences of the individuals involved, is more similar to a rhizomatic field—striated, modulated, and de- and reterritorialized—than to a linear scenario that could be described by some post-Hegelian narrative.

The key aspect of *Factories of Knowledge* is the way it demonstrates that a project of contemporary self-consciousness (Hegelian *Selbstbewusstsein*), which is the key aspect of any timely subjectivity to come, has to encompass more than the common notion of consciousness has ever grasped. That is, it must encompass the embodiment, materiality, resistance, and unconscious of the common, but also the common understood as a collectivity—or better yet, a multitude, with its interconnections, desires, and dreams. This—as becomes clear in the first pages of Raunig's book—has to happen with an acknowledgement of the commonality,

As part of the student protests there, an intervention is made to a University of Berkeley billboard.

even the banality of the singular, which, while being an exception in a state of conflict, is at the same time an element of a wider community in a state of becoming. Hence the first chapter of *Factories of Knowledge* takes on Kafka's image of Josephine, the singer in the community of mice. The weakness and strength of the common is understood as the making of the *ritournelle*, as the becoming of the refrain in which it is possible to see the other side of the common—its banality and unexceptionality: "It is not a fable and has no linear plot. Instead, it is a treatise on the relation between multitude and singularity, on the form in which singularity emerges from the multitude and how it falls back into the multitude again."[8]

Already on the formal level, Kafka's singing mouse is not a coherent, solid subject. She is a weak machine, one of many, and yet also an exception. She is a singularity, yet any other mouse could be her. As Raunig explains:

> No pathos emanates from Josephine, no messianic strength, no great notes. The weak event falls short of the strength of the many. And yet the force of

attraction of the singular becomes evident, a desire in the entire mouse folk, when even the slightest impression arises that Josephine could sing.[9]

The way of life of the mice folk is one of constant deterritorialization. Josephine's sudden virtuosity constitutes one of the moments of regrouping, transformation—not revolution really, but definitely a change. The opening chapter of Raunig's book can be seen as a rehabilitation of the reproductive and the repetitive, as an unheroic introduction to revolutionary theory and practice. This "de-heroization," I would argue, might be a necessary element in any radical theory today, after years of predominantly heroic, man-centered narratives of resistance. Raunig's project is in line with Jack Halberstam's *The Queer Art of Failure* in its criticism of neoliberal capitalism, but also in the suggestion that the common should be seen as ordinary, effeminate, vulnerable, and so on. Both Josephine and the movie and cartoon characters Halberstam analyzes follow the vulnerable, precarious logic of mistake and failure rather that triumphant resistance. The way they build opposition, critique, and subversion does not result from a plan and hegemonic effort; it is the vulnerable, precarious, erroneous agency of weak subjects. In light of their actions, the whole system of mechanic, profit-oriented, deterministic capitalist production is threatened, not by a massive strike of millions, but by the subtle irony of minoritarian subjects. Raunig emphasizes the lack of pathos in the mouse's singing, her commonplace behavior. In Halberstam's theory of failure, resistance can often be found in the unexpected contexts of popular culture, such as animated film. As s/he emphasizes:

> Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world. Failing is something queers do and have always done exceptionally well.[10]

The unconventional behavior of Kafka's mouse can be seen as a temporary refusal to be a proper mouse, as an exceptionality which, while failing to subsume the ordinary form of recognized success, proceeds as an error, a failure accomplish the normal fate of a mouse.

Emphasizing the weaknesses and prosaic nature of the common will probably be criticized as a disavowal, a repudiation of the exceptionality of the heroes of the coming revolution. Yet it is the result of Raunig's long-standing interest in feminist theories of affect and precarity. Already in an article published several years ago, entitled "What is Critique?," Raunig engaged with

examples of resistance, of "critical practice," that could very well be seen as protofeminist. Developing a point made by Michel Foucault in "What is Enlightenment? ," Raunig expands on Foucault's example of the convent of the Beguines, where women practiced an alternative life on the margins of society. Fulfilling the idea of "heterotopia," their life was a form of critical practice, of living the alternative:

> The desire for alternative forms of living generated essentially three practices of the Beguines, the withdrawal into the hermitage as an anchoress, the collective practice of living together without the rule of an order, and finally the nomadic practice of the mendicant wandering preacher.[11]

As Raunig suggests, the Beguines probably tried to translate the Bible into French in the twelfth century, before anyone else did. They also published their own analysis of the Bible and preached intensely. Although they never declared any radical position, one of the Beguines, Marguerite Porete, was actually among the most respected theologians if her day—only at the end of her life was she declared as enemy of the church and burned. Women such as Hildegarda of Bingen, the brilliant medieval philosopher, theologian, herbalist, and musician, even became saints. By reconstructing the history of the Beguines as a vivid example of long-term critical practice, Raunig pays tribute both to "herstory" research and contemporary feminist theories of resistance. The accentuation of a supposedly neutral beginning for the Beguines women, of their heterotopic position, resonates with the critique of masculine dominance, with militarized and self-centered forms of agency accepted under patriarchy and in revolutionary currents that have not combated sexism within their ranks.

Raunig's preoccupation with the non-masculine, the non-sexist, and the non-heroic might also be seen as an escape from the nonplace of the always already exceptional and fatal *homo sacer*, with all his nostalgia and supposed genderlessness so aptly criticized by Gayatri Spivak and Judith Butler in *Who Sings the Nation-State?* Spivak and Butler rightly discuss the necessity of rethinking the distributions of agency in theories such as Agamben's, where the oppressed are denied any sort of potential resistance.[12] Raunig's "singing mouse," but also the Beguines, are agents of change who do not invest in heroic, self-centered resistance. Rather, their resistance is one of failing (to accomplish the ideal of femininity, to become a proper mouse), a resistance of only partly intended subversion.

There are some, like Slavoj Zizek, who demand an understanding of classical German philosophy—particularly of Hegel—in which the

"When we are in a bad way politically or economically, her singing is supposed to save us, nothing less than that, and if it does not drive away the evil, at least gives us the strength to bear it." —Josephine the Singer, or The Mouse Folk by Franz Kafka. Copyright: David Adams.

Phenomenology of the Mind is always already a phenomenology of the materialized history of concrete existences, where the multitudes of diverse singularities are subsumed into the historical, progressive process of the constant sublation (*aufhebung)* of oppositions. Reading Raunig—but also Negri and Hardt, especially *Commonwealth*—makes Zizek's hypothesis slightly more plausible, since the very possibility of combining the critical and the Spinozan does indeed have a Hegelian sense of a newly reclaimed universality, so different from Negri's claims from the 1990s and the general philosophical turn in the Western Left. Yet in Raunig's book, Hegel is an absent reference, just as is in Zizek, Deleuze is reduced to an aspect of Hegel. Also in Raunig, Deleuze supplies the visionary models of non-nostalgic criticality, non-dogmatic materialism, and non-heroic resistance.

The most interesting moment of Raunig's book, at least from the point of view of the actuality of critical theory, is when Raunig echoes Habermas's classic analysis of the mass media's commodification of the public sphere, which Habermas advanced in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). If we were to ask about the diagnostic capacities of theories—which we probably shouldn't do in the context of the non-Aristotelian traditions discussed here—we might agree that the small chapter on media and the public in Habermas's classic is one of the most accurate descriptions of the modern transformation of cultural production, at least in the West. For example, some independent Polish curators and theorists used Habermas's arguments to critique the Polish Ministry of Culture and the more general neoliberal reorganization of state funding for the arts. In Raunig's book, the critique of the media evolves into an affirmation of the social, or

transversal, intellect, which is always a machine. Raunig reconsiders the operaist concept of the general intellect. According to Raunig, the contemporary "tendency for the cognitive to become common" does not necessarily result in emancipation; some of the corresponding effects are immediately claimed and co-opted by the profit-oriented production process.[13] Therefore, the notion of the general intellect should be replaced by the "transversal intellect," which is at the same time individual and collective, and which allows singularities to appear and intersect. Probably contrary to Raunig's intentions, I would compare the transversal intellect to Hegel's *Geist*, which develops historically, materializes in events, and acquires self-consciousness, albeit with some delay. The transversal intellect, however, with the incoherent, flailing activity of what we might call its "particles," does not follow any linear order or progress. It unfolds rhizomatically.

In his book Raunig reappropriates Deleuze's key concepts of striated spaces, striated time, war machine, and deterritorialization in order to proceed toward a new critical vision of the common in a capitalism based on cultural production. Raunig, however, focuses mostly on the West, especially in his depiction of creative industries, and here we encounter a problematic aspect of Raunig's book.[14]

As Chiapello and Boltanski rightly observed, artistic production organizes and legitimizes neoliberal capital accumulation. Raunig criticizes "creatives" for their part in imposing injustice. The new creative subjects, produced in a supposedly nonhierarchical, nonauthoritarian environment, are often complicit agents in gentrification, the transformation of universities into neoliberal factories, the exclusions of migrants and workers, and other key aspects of neoliberalism.

The occupations of universities, depicted at length in the Occupy chapter of Raunig's book, raise the notion of the radical public—another reference to Habermas, and possibly also to Kluge and Negt in their search for proletarian publics and the connections they draw between the factory and the production of the public. While discussing the neoliberal transformations of universities today, Raunig joins ongoing debates over the public, which is crucial in a time of the accelerated reduction of the public sector.[15]

The topic of the strike, introduced in an analysis of Gustav Metzger's work *Art Strike* (1977–1980), is an interesting, yet not unproblematic, moment in Raunig's book. It is possible that since I'm from Gdańsk, the epicenter of the Polish general strike of 1980 that led to the formation of the "Solidarność" independent workers' unions, which registered some ten thousand members in only six months, I tend to see the strike as a group activity, and a massive one. Reading Marx, Bakunin, and Sorel has only strengthened this view. Therefore, the story of one artist's strike seems like a feeble model for a contemporary

One of the advertisements from a 1986 campaign launched by art writer Stewart Home shows solicited motherly advice on the art strike of 1990–93.

project of resistance, and it definitely doesn't enrich our understanding of the common. In Raunig's own words, and Metzger's too, the strike is "the chief weapon of the workers fighting the system," and the plural here is, I believe, of some importance.[16] I understand that using an example from art history might make the strike even more appealing today, yet—again from Poland—the 2013 strike of the entire staff of the Centre for Contemporary Art in Warsaw can perhaps serve as a better example of resistance. I think Raunig's general argument in the book—the argument that common resistance is nonheroic—could be used to further deconstruct or deterritorialize Metzger's strategy, and to reappropriate it critically.

Parallel to the strike, Occupy, and other heterotopic sites of resistance, Raunig refers to Foucault's lecture "The Courage of Truth" and its key concept of *parrhesia*. *Parrhesia* allowed ancient philosophers to build public debates that were without the constraints of class, nationality, gender, and ethnicity. The occupations and other forms of public resistance would not have been possible without it. Raunig suggests that it is necessary to consider the actual content of the speech of the occupiers, a point that is absent from many analyses of the movement. For example, in Judith Butler's otherwise beautiful text "Bodily Vulnerability, Coalitions and Street Politics," she does away with the content of the protestors' speech, which leads to a presumption that bodies are mute in the protest.[17] They are not mute. The content of their claims constitutes an element of their embodied practice, together with their smiles, screams, tears, pain, and joy. Any analysis of embodied affect cannot do away with words. Doing so does not make the analysis more materialistic, only more alienated. Interestingly, in

Students protest against education cuts at the University of Melbourme Parkville, September, 2013.

Ewa Majewska is a feminist philosopher and activist and lecturer in Gender Studies at University of Warsaw, Poland. Currently Dr. Majewska is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Cultural Inquiry (ICI) Berlin. She is the author of two books: *Feminizm jako filozofia społeczna (Feminism as Social Philosophy)* and *Sztuka jako pozór? (Art as appearance? On censorship and other forms of politics of culture)*, and numerous articles and essays.

Antigone's Claim Butler combines an analysis of Antigone's discursive practices with her bodily agency. In Raunig's narrative, we see the protesters—their bodies, their vulnerability, their naıveté—but we also hear their claims, which paints a more adequate picture of the protests.

The profit-oriented attitudes that dominate universities today result in students' devastating dependence on students loans, and in the defunding of departments and programs that do not seem profitable from the point of view of capital. The point system, established in order to make different universities more compatible, results in a lack of student-professor exchange and produces a strictly alienated, technical approach to knowledge, supporting only instrumental, not emancipatory, forms of cultural capital. It only is via protests and resistance that the university becomes a public space again. The occupations, as paradoxical as it might sound, remind us of the proper educational function of universities. One of the most valuable aspects of Raunig's book is the way it shows the productivity inherent to resistance. This resistance does not follow the masculine, heroic patterns of previous uprisings. It is a modest, playful resistance, like that of a subversive mouse. The precarious of the world do indeed unite in Raunig's text—or at least they see a common horizon in the becoming of a rebellious song.

X

This piece is dedicated to my colleagues and students at the Department of *Contemporary Culture (Kultura Wspolczesna) , Jagiellonian University,* which was subject to budget cuts in 2013.

1
At Jagiellonian University in Krakow in 2012, a small protest called "Awaria Uniwersytetu" (The University's Dysfunction) took place when students realized that they would not be able to continue their studies with the professors they wanted to study with and the programs they were promised. The protest led to some positive changes, such as the continued employment of one of the professors and the salvaging of the majority of the programs. However, one year later the Department of Contemporary Culture (Kultura Wspolczesna) was dissolved, supposedly due to austerity cuts. Still, the idea that students and workers of the university can protest against neoliberal transformation prevailed. A sense of solidarity and resistance against precarity was displayed in an open letter criticizing the mechanical approach to teachers and programs, which, as the students rightly pointed out, cannot be arbitrarily replaced. The protest against the quantitative approach was combined with a wider critique of neoliberalization. I would like to express my gratitude to the students and colleagues at the Department of Contemporary Culture for defending my further employment in these events. There are no words that could do justice to both their involvement and my sense of solidarity and support.

2
See the website of the Free/Slow University of Warsaw http://www.wuw-warsaw.pl/program.php?lang=eng

3
Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere, A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," *Social Text* 25/26 (1992): 56–80.

4
See, for example, Paweł Markowski, *Polityka wrażliwości. Wprowadzenie do humanistyki* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Universitas, 2013).

5
Gerald Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity* (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2013), 38.

6
Ibid., 46.

7
Krystian Szadkowski, "Uniwersytet jako przestrzeń modulacji i molekularnego oporu," *Praktyka Teoretyczna* 3.9 (2013).

8
Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge*, 9.

9
Ibid., 11.

10
Jack (Judith) Halberstam, *The Queer Art of Failure* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 2.

11
Gerald Raunig, "What is Critique?: Suspension and Recomposition in Textual and Social Machines," *Trasversal* , Aug. 2008

12
Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, *Who Sings the Nation-State?: Language, Politics, Belonging* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

13
Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge*, 65.

14
Gayatri Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Immanuel Wallerstein, *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power* (New York: The New Press, 2006).

15
See Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality?: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy* (New York: Beacon Press, 2003); Judith Levine, *Harmful to Minors: The Perils of Protecting Children From Sex* (Minneapolis: University of Minneassotta Press, 2002).

16
Raunig, *Factories of Knowledge*, 138.

17
Judith Butler, "Bodily Vulnerability, Coalitions and Street Politics," in *The State of Things* , ed. M. Kuzma (Oslo: Office for Contemporary Art Norway, 2012).